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Abstract 
This thesis is about the cost of funds to borrowers and access to formal sector credit by 
smallholder oil palm growers in the Hoskins oil palm project in Papua New Guinea. This 
study finds that the cost of funds to smallholder oil palm grower borrowers is high and 
their access to formal sector credit is restricted. The study has uncovered many 
underlying factors responsible for this situation. It is not the result of goverrunent policies 
nor of actions of the formal commercial financial sector. These underlying factors are 
driven by insecure land titles and poor savings and banking history. 
This research enriches the existing literature on the determinants of fmancial 
development by contributing to the understanding of three important factors: borrower 
transaction cost, property rights and relationship banking. It shows that the development 
of an efficient property rights system and a good relationship with commercial banks 
would lower the cost of funds and enhance financial development. This study contributes 
to the growing empirical research that analyses the determinants of financial 
development. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis is about the cost of funds to borrowers and access to credit in Papua New 
Guinea. The research examines the factors that raise the cost of funds to borrowers using 
survey data from smallholder oil palm growers. The research enriches the literature on 
rural fmance in developing countries by adding to the understanding of three important 
factors, namely borrower transaction cost, property rights and relationship banking that 
determines the cost of funds and access to rural credit. 
This chapter begins by defining the scope and focus of this research, before providing a 
brief overview of the research methodology and a description of the research objectives. 
Finally, the structure of the thesis is outlined. 
1.1 Research scope and focus 
The important role of finance in economic development has long been established 
(Schumpter 1934).1 Although sceptics question the high level of emphasis placed on 
finance as a determinant of economic growth (Lucas 1988:6), there is a consensus 
amongst economists that the links between financial mobilisation and intermediation and 
economic growth are strong (Levine et al. 2000). However, both theoretical and 
1 The original work is Shumpeter (1911) but reprinted in 1934. 
empirical evidence to date is inconclusive about the direction of causality (Levine 
2004:85). 
Levine (2004) provides the latest extensive review of the literature on the theory and 
empirical evidence for the nexus between finance and economic growth. His review 
makes the point that financial systems emerge to ameliorate (they cannot eliminate) three 
costs of financial transactions by performing five functions. The three costs involved in 
financial transaction are information costs, enforcement costs and transaction costs. The 
five functions of financial systems are: (i) the production of information ex ante about 
possible investments and the allocation of capital; (ii) monitoring investments and 
exerting corporate governance after providing finance; (iii) facilitating the trade, 
diversification, and management of risk; (iv) mobilising and pooling savings; and (v) 
easing the exchange of goods and services. 
Information costs are associated with evaluating firms, managers, and market conditions 
prior to making investment decisions. Enforcement costs refer to the degree to which the 
providers of capital can effectively monitor and influence how firms use the capital. 
Transaction costs refer to the costs incurred in executing a financial transaction. Financial 
intermediation may reduce the costs associated with acquiring and processing 
information. Financial intermediaries may facilitate shareholders and creditors to monitor 
firms and induce managers to maximise firm value. Financial markets and intermediaries 
may arise to ease the trading, hedging, and pooling of risk across firms, industries and 
regions (cross-sectional risk), across time (inter-temporal) and liquidity (cost and speed at 
which financial instruments can be converted into purchasing power). Through financial 
intermediation, numerous financial arrangements may arise to mobilise savings for 
2 
investment by mitigating the transaction costs associated with savings mobilisation and 
overcommg the informational asymmetries associated with making savers feel 
comfortable in relinquishing control of their savings. Finally, the emergence of 
specialised financial intermediaries may ease exchange by lowering both transaction and 
information costs. 
Therefore, different types of contracts, markets and intermediaries emerge to address the 
three costs and perform the five functions. Each of these functions influences savings and 
investment decisions and hence economic growth. However, across countries and time, 
distinct financial contracts, markets and intermediaries have emerged because legal, 
regulatory and policy regimes differ. These differences will have different implications 
for resource allocation and welfare depending on the frictions present in the economy. 
Financial development therefore entails improvements in all these five functions and 
reductions in information, enforcement and transaction costs. 
The summary of Levine (2004: 4-25) presented above provides the background for 
defining the research scope and focus for this study. 2 
1.1.1 Research scope 
During the 1950s, interventionist policies in the form of directed credit, interest rate 
ceilings, and state ownership of financial institutions were common (Y aron et al. 
1998:147). The rationale behind the pursuit of these interventionist policies was that 
improving access to credit was a means of alleviating poverty (Remenyi 1991 :ix-x). The 
2 These five functions were mentioned in an earlier paper (Levine 1997: 691-701). 
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assumption behind this strategy was that improved access to credit would facilitate the 
adoption of new technology that would improve productivity, raise incomes and move 
the poor out of poverty. 
However, there exists a body of literature on the failure of these interventions (Adams 
1971; Adams and Graham 1981; Adams et al. 1984; Braverman and Guasch 1986). The 
interventionist polices resulted in capital market fragmentation and condemned these 
economies to inferior technology and poor growth (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973). The 
standard policy recommendation to overcome the problems that arose, based on the 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) analysis, was fmancial market deregulation. There is 
however a body of literature that supports state interventions in areas where market 
failure exists (Morduch 1999; Besley 1994). 
This debate leads to the pursuit of efficient and successful rural financial intermediation 
(Yaron et al. 1998; Y aron 1994 ). The literature identifies three distinct features that 
distinguished developing country credit markets from other credit markets (Besley 
1994:31-32). These are scarce collateral, underdeveloped complementary institutions, 
and covariant risk and segmented markets. This type of market structure encourages 
informal financial market intermediation whereby local actors such as money lenders, 
friends and relatives, or Rotating Savings and Credit Associations play significant roles 
that are founded on local information, enforcement mechanisms and operations (Besley 
1994:32). Compared to formal financial intermediaries, informal intermediaries are 
inefficient (Morduch 1999; Besley 1995a; Townsend 1995; Platteau 1997; Dercon 2002). 
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For all these reasons, the financial system of developing countries consists of informal, 
government owned and formal financial intermediaries. 
1.1.2 Research focus 
Different types of financial contracts, markets, and intermediaries emerge because there 
are costs involved in the acquisition of information, enforcement of contracts, and 
making transactions (Levine 2004:4). The important role of information in financial 
transaction has been established (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).3 The emerging empirical 
based literature discusses enforcement through analysis of the role played by the legal 
system (Beck et al. 2003; Claessens and Laeven 2003; Levine 1998). There is also a large 
body of literature that analyses the impact of transaction costs (Gonzales-Vega 1976; 
1984; Ladman 1984) using many empirical applications in developing countries (Abiad 
et al. 1988; Dat 1998; Gonzales-Vega 1976; 1984; Ladman 1984). 
This study focuses on how the cost of funds to borrowers can be lowered and thereby 
increase access to formal sector credit through financial development in a developing 
country context. 
1.2 Research objectives, motivation and questions 
The pnmary objective of this research is to identify the factors that constrain 
smallholders from accessing finance from the formal sector in Papua New Guinea. There 
are three motivating factors behind this research objective. Firstly, the cost of funds to 
3 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) discuss the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard involved in 
financial transactions. Adverse selection refers to the case where the lender runs the risk of funding a risky 
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business in Papua New Guinea is high. The interest rates for Papua New Guinea, 
Australia and the United States depicted in Figure 1.1 show the severity of this problem. 
Figure 1.1 Comparison of Treasury Bill Rates in Parity Terms Between 
Papua New Guinea, Australia and the United States, 1980 to 2002 * 
30 
25 
20 
"' <!) 15 ta 
~ 
10 
5 
0 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Year 
---PNGTB --us TB -.-ATE 
* PNGTB is Papua New Guinea Treasury Bills, USTB is United States Treasury Bills 
and ATB is Australian Treasury Bills. 
Source: Data from Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, (Various 
Issues, 1980-2002). 
The large gap between interest rates in Papua New Guinea and in the two developed 
economies of Australia and the United States, especially after 1994 (see Figure 1.1), 
demonstrates the high cost of undertaking investments iu Papua New Guiuea.4 The 
implication from this data (Figure 1.1) is that only highly profitable investments will 
or bad project. Moral hazard refers to the case where, once funded, the creditor runs the risk that the debtor 
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receive external funding. The high interest rates demonstrated by the formal financial 
sector in Papua New Guinea point to the cost of funds to the smallholder sector being 
very high and severely restricting smallholders from accessing credit from formal 
financial institutions. 
Furthermore, the underlying causes of the high interest costs are beyond the influence of 
individual smallholder borrowers. However, they may be able to lower their marginal 
borrowing costs. Using information obtained from smallholder oil palm growers from the 
Hoskins oil palm project in Papua New Guinea, this thesis analyses whether these 
growers are able to reduce their marginal borrowing costs and improve access to formal 
sector credit. The Hoskins project is studied because the structural set-up of the project 
appears ideal for lowering the marginal costs of borrowing. Similar conditions cannot be 
found in other parts of the country (see more details in Chapter 3). 
Attempts to develop the rural fmancial sector in Papua New Guinea have largely failed. 
The World Bank (1997:18-19) concluded that nearly three decades of public sector 
interventions in rural financial intermediation have not led to the establishment of any 
sustainable fmancial institution and that the environment in Papua New Guinea has large 
obstacles for the development of rural financial institutions. 
There have been no empirical studies using microeconomic data from field surveys in 
Papua New Guinea to study the fmancial sector. This study is the first to analyse the 
issues confronting rural financial development in Papua New Guinea. 
will not commit fully to the project. In both cases the risks of defuult are high. 
4 In 1994 the Papua New Guinea currency was floated. 
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To operationalise the research objective, two research questions were posed: 
• How high is the cost of funds to small borrowers? 
• What factors have led to the high cost of funds? 
The first question is addressed using the concept of borrower transaction costs. This 
analysis provides estimates of the magnitude of the cost of funds to borrowers. The 
second question is addressed using the property rights theory as it relates to land titles 
and the theory of relationship banking. The latter two components of the analysis explain 
why the cost of funds has remained high and consequently restricted smallholder access 
to formal sector credit. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The rest of the chapters are organised as follows: Chapter two presents a theoretical 
model. The cost of funds model (Chand 2001) is linked to existing models in the 
literature on finance and development and transaction costs. This theoretical model is 
designed to depict the financial system in Papua New Guinea and provides the theoretical 
underpinnings of the analysis of the two research questions. 
Chapter three discusses the methodology used in the empirical analysis. The reasons for 
choosing the Hoskins smallholder oil palm growers, the sampling technique, the survey 
questionnaire, and the interviews undertaken are described. The limitations of the study 
and the constraints faced during the field research are also presented in this chapter. 
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Chapters four, five and six present the empirical analysis. Chapter four uses the concept 
of borrower transaction costs to estimate the magnitude of the cost of funds to 
smallholder oil palm grower borrowers. Chapters five and six provide explanations of the 
factors underlying the high cost of funds to borrowers estimated in chapter four. Chapter 
five uses property rights theory to analyse the role of land titles in the high cost of funds 
to borrowers. Chapter six uses the literature on relationship lending to analyse the role of 
bank account ownership in the high cost of funds to borrowers. The concluding chapter 
summarises the main research findings and discusses policy and research implications. 
9 
Chapter2 
Analytical Framework: The Cost of Funds Model 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework for the thesis. It also draws out the 
theoretical predictions tested in the following chapters that are based on empirical data. 
The model used in this thesis is derived in Section 2 .I by linking three sets of models 
drawn from the literature. Section 2.2 draws out the theoretical implications for analysis 
in the subsequent chapters. 
2.1 Derivation of the Cost of Funds model 
The initial Cost of Funds model was derived directly with the theoretical and policy 
implications relevant to the theme of this research in mind. This model is based on Chand 
(2001). The chapter reviews two sets of earlier models and links these with the Cost of 
Funds model. The first is the standard financial sector model taken from the finance and 
development literature and the second is a microeconomic-based model using transaction 
cost theory. 
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2.1. l The standard financial sector model 
The standard financial sector model is based on the seminal works of McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973). Figure 2.1 depicts this model. Demand for credit is negatively related 
to the interest rate and the supply of credit is positively related to the interest rate. 
McKinnon's argument (1973) for this relationship is that the 'lumpiness' of the 
expenditure on investment using self-raised funding requires prior savings accumulation 
before investments can be made. Since positive and high real interest rates encourage 
savings accumulation, investments will occur only when the rate of return on investment 
exceeds the real rate of interest earned from savings. Shaw's justification for this 
relationship is that high interest rates encourage savings accumulation but discourage 
investment in low yielding projects (Shaw 1973). Interest rates are therefore positively 
related to savings and negatively related to investment. 
In this standard model, savings accumulation defines the supply curve and investment 
demand defines the demand curve. The aggregate demand and supply determines the 
market demand (D) and supply (S) (see Figure 2.1 ). 
Both McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) used this model to show that government 
interventions in the credit market will cause credit market segmentation, drive credit 
away from profitable projects to marginal projects, and condenm economies to reliance 
on inferior technology and low growth. The following example demonstrates this analysis 
(see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 Standard Model of Financial Sector 
Interest Rate 
r' 
re. . ................................... ,,,. f······························· + ..................................... ,,_ 
Ls Le Ld 
s 
D 
Amount demanded 
or supplied 
According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) the market clears at interest rate r, and 
loan amount Le- In the presence of restrictive policies like interest rate ceilings, the rate of 
interest will be set administratively at re. As a result, demand expands to Ld while supply 
remains at L~ The area between L, and Ld depicts excess demand. Lenders are likely to 
use this excess demand and employ non-price credit-rationing techniques and divert 
investments from profitable to marginal investment projects. The intervention also 
restricts lenders to mobilise savings at high cost to lend at rates below profitable levels. 
This will restrict savings mobilisation and will encourage the proliferation of informal 
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financial institutions in both savings and credit mobilisation as the financial sector is 
segmented into formal and informal sectors. 
Financial markets of developing countries do not seem to work as classical competitive 
markets due to the prevalence of market imperfections and government interventions 
(Hoff and Stiglitz 1990:235; Besley 1994:29). Since McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
assumed classical competitive markets when deriving the demand and supply functions, 
the prevalence of market failures and government interventions makes the supply and 
demand function derivation process less relevant to developing countries. Particular 
attention is therefore paid when deriving the supply and demand functions in section 
2.1.2 so that the Cost of Funds model represents the realities of developing country 
financial markets. 
2.1.2 Microeconomic based model 
The supply curve is derived from a lender cost minimisation problem suggested by 
Gongales-Vega (1976, 1984). The lender is assumed to minimise costs in order to be 
profitable. There are four components of the total cost of lending. These are the 
opportunity cost of funds, administration costs, expenditure on risk-minimisation, and 
default costs. The opportunity cost of funds can be estimated from the marginal rate of 
return from an alterative use of the loanable funds (Gongalez-Vega 1976). It can also be 
taken as the cost at which the lender has borrowed funds from savers. This cost is 
assumed to be constant. Administration costs consist of initiating, recording, despatching 
and collecting repayments. This is a fixed cost independent of the loan size. 
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Expenditure on risk reduction consists of expenditure on screening of loan applications 
prior to loan approvals and monitoring project performance and loan repayments after 
granting the loan. Because of the asymmetry of information between lenders and 
borrowers, risk cannot be eliminated (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) even if expenditure on 
risk reduction is increased. The lender is aiming to lower costs associated with the 
probability of the borrower defaulting on a loan. In the event of default, the lender loses 
the total loan, opportunity costs, administration costs and the expenditure on risk-
reduction strategies. To insure itself against this possibility, the lender charges a risk-
premium. The risk premium is calculated using a rate of default, which is a function of 
information from past experience and risk-reducing expenditure. 
Collectively, administration, risk-reducing expenditure and default cost constitute the 
lender's transaction cost component of the total cost of lending. The total cost of lending 
is therefore the sum of transaction plus opportunity cost of funds. The lender maximises 
profits by optimising the total cost of lending. The supply curve is therefore the upward 
sloping segment of the marginal cost of lending. 
The demand curve is derived from a borrower profit maximisation problem following Dat 
(1998). The following summarises Dal's (1998: 26-27) argument on the derivation of the 
downward sloping demand curve. The demand for credit is determined by initial 
endowments, production, access to and cost of alternative sources of credit, and the 
borrower's attitude toward risk. The borrower is assumed to borrow for working capital 
in the context of a given production function exhibiting diminishing marginal 
productivity of all inputs. The borrower would demand credit up to the point where the 
expected marginal rate of return on the credit use equals the marginal cost of credit. The 
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marginal rate of return on credit will diminish because of the diminishing marginal rate of 
return of variable inputs. This means that the demand for credit will be negatively sloped. 
The supply and demand functions derived here are similar to the positively sloping 
supply function and negatively sloping demand function represented in Figure 2.1. But 
this demand function excludes borrower transaction costs. Borrowers incur these costs 
while searching for potential lenders, completing forms, attending interviews, signing up 
to loans, paying loan administration fees, and making regular loan repayments. The 
significance of the borrower transaction costs is that at the advertised lending interest rate 
an investment may look attractive but the 'hidden' transaction costs to the borrower is 
expensive (Dat 1998: 29). 
The model that captures borrower's total cost optimisation follows Ladman (1984). The 
total cost of borrowing is the sum of interest costs and borrower transaction costs. The 
one borrower/one lender model and the one borrower/two-lender model put forward by 
Ladman (1984) are depicted in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. 
From Figure 2.2, it can be seen that the average total borrowing cost curve will approach 
the line that cuts the vertical at r for a given interest rate r. Profit maximisation implies 
that, the borrower has to borrow L * and earn L *(AR-AC) in profits. There is a threshold 
point T1 below which the borrower will not borrow from this lender because the loan 
amounts below this threshold are loss-making. This indicates that increases in the average 
borrower transaction cost lower profits and increase the borrowing threshold. 
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Figure 2.2 Borrowing Costs and Revenues: One Lender 
Borrowing Cost 
and Revenue 
r 
=MR 
0 L* 
AC 
Anlountde111anded 
or supplied 
Linking the discussions based on Figure 2.2 to Figure 2.3, it is found that the decision to 
borrow fro111 one lender will not be influenced by the interest rate alone, but by the total 
cost of borrowing in which the size of loan plays an illlportant role in 111aintaining 
profitability. The borrower is forced to choose between a for111al lender offering large 
loans (Lj) at low interest rates (rj) but who i111poses higher borrower transactions costs 
(ACj) and an infor111al lender offering s111all loans (LJ at high interest rates (rJ but who 
i111poses lower borrower transactions costs (ACi). The threshold loan sizes beyond which 
the two different lenders car111ot fall are T1 for formal lenders and T; for informal lenders. 
The 111arket will be partitioned at the loan size about which all borrowers in the 111arket 
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will be indifferent. This is where the effective cost of borrowing from both lenders is 
equal for all borrowers (Ladman 1984:112), depicted as point L 0 in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3 Borrowing Costs and Revenue: Two Lenders 
Borrowing cost 
and revenue 
D=MR 
AR 
Amount demanded 
or supplied 
Borrower transaction costs will therefore impact on the decision to borrow and on 
profitability. Ladman (1984:109) identified three implications of this analysis. First, 
larger borrower transaction costs imply a higher total cost of borrowing and less profit. 
Second, for a given interest rate and borrower transaction cost, a borrower will not 
borrow below the threshold level where the average total cost of borrowing is equal to 
average revenue. This is the loan size below which the borrower will not be willing to 
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borrow. Third, since the borrower transaction costs are spent in advance of receiving the 
loan, they are part of the threshold amount. Borrowers who caunot fund these out-of-
pocket costs will not be able to borrow from that particular lender. Even for those 
borrowers who can afford the out-of-pocket costs but face a positive probability of 
rejection face losing this money and therefore may not attempt to borrow from this 
lender. Compared to potential borrowers with a prior relationship with both the lender 
and the large borrowers, small and first-time borrowers face a greater possibility of 
falling below these thresholds. 
This framework provides an explanation for the coexistence of lenders offering credit at 
different interest rates and involving different borrower transaction costs. The main 
implication of this model is that the borrower's decision to borrow is determined by the 
effective cost of borrowing. Lending rates, borrower transaction costs and loan size all 
play a part in the decision to borrow from a particular lender. The cost of funds model 
(Chand 2001) discussed next generalises the one-borrower/two-lender case to depict the 
multi-financial instruments, markets and intermediaries that form the financial systems in 
the real situations of developing countries. 
2.1.3 The Cost of Funds model 
In its initial formulation, the Cost of Funds model was derived directly (Chand 2001). 
Here, the model is integrated with the two models reviewed above. 
Both models reviewed above demonstrate that the supply of funds is positively related to 
interest rates and the demand for funds is negatively related to interest rates. Equalising 
18 
demand for funds with supply gives the market clearing. The cost of funds model is 
intended to define the envelope. 
The total cost of funds to a borrower is depicted in equation 2. I 
er =F+rK (2.1) 
where CT is the total cost of funds, Fis the total fixed costs of accessing funds and K is 
the value of the loan, and r which is the marginal cost to the lender is a function of K. 
F depicts the costs associated with accessmg funds. This 1s a fixed cost that 1s 
independent of the loan amount. 
The variable r is the marginal cost of funds. For the lender, r incorporates the marginal 
costs associated with mobilising funds and then lending. 
The average cost of funds to the borrower defines the cost of funds model as depicted in 
equation 2.2. 
F C(K)=-+r 
K 
T 
where C(K) = C and K > 0. 
K 
(2.2) 
This equation (2.2) depicts the cost of funds to the firm. This links the two models 
reviewed to the Cost of Funds model, and defines an overall financial system with many 
financial intermediaries, markets and instruments. 
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Taking the first and second derivatives with respect to K as in equations 2.3 and 2.4, 
respectively, confirms a hyperbolic relationship as depicted in Figure 2.3. 
ac F 
-=--<0 
DK K 2 
(2.3) 
(2.4) 
The intuition behind this model is that financial intermediaries acquire funds at the cost 
of rand lend to businesses at a cost determined by the C(K) schedule .. This model depicts 
the existence and functioning of a myriad of financial intermediaries with comparative 
advantages in serving distinct market segments. 
Points on the vertical axis in Figure 2.4 represent levels of the unit cost of funds and the 
horizontal axis represents total borrowing. The C(K) schedule constitutes the lower 
envelope depicting the cost of funds to enterprises of varying sizes. The horizontal line r 
depicts the optimal marginal cost of funds to the lender. The area between the C(K) 
schedule and r therefore constitutes the access cost to borrowers. Other features of this 
figure are explained in the next section in the context of discussing the theoretical 
implications of the model. 
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Figure 2.4 Depiction of Cost of Funds to Business 
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2.2 Theoretical implications of the Cost of Funds model 
Six theoretical implications have been identified as arising from the cost of funds model 
described above. This section also discusses theoretical responses to the two research 
questions posed in Chapter 1. Discussion of the empirically testable implications are 
reserved for the next section. 
The first implication to be drawn from the model relates to the relationship between K 
and F. As K approaches infinity, F approaches zero. This relationship predicts that fixed 
K 
costs (F} will be critical in defining both the loan size and source of loan for firms that 
demand small loans. 
The second implication relates to the relationship between K and C (K). As K increases 
the C(K) schedule declines and at some point falls below the lender's optimal marginal 
cost of lending, r. Chand (2001 :10) explains that the conditions under which the C(K) 
schedule may be lower than r are explained by the behaviour of the average and 
variances of the return from debts and equity, respectively. The bond price or the price of 
other long-term securities may best define the optimal marginal cost of capital (r). Debt 
fmancing represents a contractual claim on the borrower. The firm is committed to the 
provision of periodic payments over the term of the loan as defined in the contract. 
Equity has a residual claim to the firm's income and assets. Equities have voting rights 
and no maturity dates. The average return from a debt is therefore larger than that of 
equity. However, because of the higher risk associated with equities as compared to debt, 
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the variance of the return on equity is larger than the variance on the return on debt. This 
implies that, beyond point :fl, equity is more attractive for the firm than the issue of debt. 
Large and growing firms will therefore have greater choice of intermediaries, markets 
and instruments because they will accumulate information and assets which will enable 
them to acquire credit at lower costs. Small fmns will be uncompetitive and restricted to 
limited intermediaries, markets and instruments. They will be confined to the small loan 
and high cost market segment. 
The third implication relates to the composition of participants in the financial system. 
The area between the C(K) schedule and r determines the emergence of different 
fmancial intermediaries, instruments and markets. Since the access cost are consequences 
of the differences in dealing with information, enforcement and transaction costs, 
different intermediaries with comparative advantages in serving the different segments of 
the market could emerge. 
Informal financial intermediaries such as moneylenders, friends and relatives, and 
rotating savings and credit associations will serve small firms lacking collateral or credit 
history who are demanding small loans. This market segment exists to the left of II' 
featuring high cost of funds and relatively large transaction costs. These informal 
fmancial institutions rely on existing social networks as sources of information in 
monitoring and enforcement. This is the region where informal fmancial institutions 
function effectively and where formal institutions fail (Besley 1995a: 117). 
In contrast commercial banks will serve the market segment II' Jil. Since loans to the left 
of II' are small, commercial banks would not fmd this segment profitable. Commercial 
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banks may also withdraw from serving the market segment to the right of JJl because the 
access cost to borrowers would be low for profit maximising banks. Integration of the 
small loans market with the commercial banks is possible, as depicted by the wiggly line 
EI The ownership of bank accounts with a commercial bank would be an important 
integrating instrument. Firms to the right of JJl are large enough to seek funds from the 
securities market. 
The fourth implication concerns the composition of the access costs. The absence of 
modern social (healthy and literate population and law and order in particular) and 
economic (transport and communication in particular) infrastructure, and institutions that 
define and enforce both property rights and contracts would increase the access costs. 
Profitable financial intermediaries may service this area but would impose high access 
cost. Firms either borrow at this high cost or would choose to seek loans from alternative 
sources. 
The fifth implication relates to interventionist policies. Restrictive legal and regulatory 
policy measures could increase access demand for loans, with two implications. First, 
inefficient financial intermediaries could enter the market and squeeze efficient 
intermediaries out. Second, intermediaries established with interventionist intentions will 
ration credit by increasing borrower transaction costs because of the excess demand, as 
explained before. 
To demonstrate the impact of a restrictive interventionist policy, refer to the interest rate 
ceiling depicted by point ,.Zin Figure 2.3. Since the interest rate ceiling is lower than the 
market rate, extra-legal (informal) intermediaries serve the market segment If' Ir. As a 
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consequence, the commercial banks' market share is squeezed to sZ J!l. However, the 
access costs are high but are forced downwards. This would jnstify increased borrower 
transaction costs through credit rationing. This is exactly the same result as from the 
example relating to Figure 2.1. 
The sixth implication relates to the opportunity cost of funds. The opportunity cost of 
funds sets the benchmark for each lender as indicated by the r line. Lenders will charge 
their own profit margins and the transaction cost of lending on top of the benchmark 
rates. A high opportunity cost of funds will therefore raise the cost of funds to borrowers. 
The factors that determine the opportunity costs are country risk factors (political and 
economic), monetary policy, fiscal policy, exchange rate policy, and so on (Demirgu-
Kunt et al. 2003). 
Overall, these implications show that the cost of funds to borrowers is high when the 
access costs are high and the loan size is small. This provides a theoretical framework 
within which to examine the two research questions. The next section links the theoretical 
analysis to the empirical analysis. 
2.3 Empirical application 
Equation 2.5 depicts the formula for the standard effective interest rates (e), which is 
derived from compound interest equation on the net loan received (Dat 1998:123) and 
operationalises the Cost of Funds model. The effective interest rate is a function of 
lending rates (r), loan amount (L), total borrower transaction cost (TBTC) and the term of 
the loan (t). 
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1 
e=(l+r)( L )' -1 L-TBTC (2.5) 
First, Equation 2 .5 explicitly identifies the variables for which data can be generated for 
empirical analysis from a survey of borrowers as Dat (1998:125) did in the case of 
Vietnam. Second, effective interest rate estimation reveals the overall cost of borrowing. 
For instance, net-loan amount is used because TBTC consists of money spent upfront. 
This is particularly important for small loans where TBTC as a proportion ofloan amount 
can be substantial. Third, although interest rates are defmed annually, repayments are 
made frequently (monthly, quarterly or half-yearly). The three empirical chapters 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6) use the survey data to test the theoretical implications. 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on modelling financial systems and adopted a 
model that more accurately depicts the financial system commonly found in developing 
countries. The theoretical predictions from the model are directly linked to the research 
objective and the two research questions discussed in Chapter 1. The effective interest 
rate equation (equation 2.5) operationalises the cost of funds model. The next Chapter (3) 
describes the data collection process that provided the data for the empirical analysis in 
the three empirical chapters that follow. 
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3.0 Introduction 
Chapter3 
Research Methodology 
This chapter describes the selection of interviewees and the conduct of a survey in Papua 
New Guinea to gather relevant data. To place the field survey in context, the chapter 
begins with a description of the financial system in Papua New Guinea. The chapter then 
describes the population and sampling technique, the survey questionnaire used, and 
interviews and group discussions undertaken. The chapter ends with a discussion of the 
main limitations of this study and the constraints faced during the field research. 
3.1 A brief review of the financial system in Papua New Guinea 
This short review of the financial system in Papua New Guinea uses the cost of funds 
framework depicted in Figure 2.3. The intention is to show the relevance of the cost of 
funds model in the Papua New Guinea context. 
The literature defines financial institutions that fall within the control of the Central bank 
as 'formal' and those unregulated as 'informal' (Adams and Fitchett 1992b:2). While 
accepting this classification, a third classification used in this research is the government 
fmancial institutions. These are both formal and informal financial institutions 
established by the government with specific policy objectives. The fmancial system in 
Papua New Guinea can therefore be analysed as consisting of three main sectors: the 
private informal and formal sector financial institutions and in between are the 
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government financial institutions, which appear to have features of both formal and 
informal institutions. 
The informal financial sector institutions serve the market segment to the left of Ii' in 
Figure 2.3. Writing during the early 1990s, Fernando (199la,b, 1992) identified the 
following informal sector institutions: sande, wok meri, wantok, friends and relatives, less 
organised moneylenders and store owners. 5 By 2000, organised money lenders and 
'quick' money schemes could also be added to this list (Kavanamur 2000:41-43). The 
organised moneylenders directly deduct repayments from salaries. The quick money 
schemes are actually pyramid schemes. Anecdotal evidence provides overwhelming 
support for the presence and active operation of the informal sector in Papua New 
Guinea. However, the magnitude of the informal financial sector has not been estimated 
or studied empirically. 
The formal financial sector of Papua New Guinea in 2004 consisted of the Central Bank, 
commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions, and the Port Moresby stock exchange. 
While four of the five commercial banks are subsidiaries of foreign banks, the fifth, the 
Bank of South Pacific Ltd, is nationally owned. The Bank of South Pacific purchased the 
state owned commercial bank (Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation) when it was 
privatised in 2002 (Bank South Pacific Limited 2002:3). The non-bank financial sector 
institutions consist of insurance agencies, fmance companies and superannuation funds 
(Bank of Papua New Guinea, nd). There are two large superannuation funds, one each for 
'In Tok Pisin, the most commonly-used lingua franca used in Papua New Guinea, Sande is Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCA), Wok Meri is Women's Work, and Wantok refers to anyone who 
belongs to the same clan group or, more broadly language group. Women's work is ROSCA amongst 
women. 
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the private and public sector employees. The Port Moresby Stock Exchange has thirteen 
companies listed (Port Moresby Stock Exchange 2004). Seven of the companies traded 
on the stock exchange are local subsidiaries of international companies engaged in 
mining and petroleum projects. Two of the Papua New Guinea based companies are 
agricultural companies (Ramu Sugar Limited and New Britain Palm Oil Limited); there is 
one commercial bank (Bank South Pacific Ltd) and one finance company (Credit 
corporation (PNG) Limited); there is one transport and merchandise company operating 
in Papua New Guinea, SteamShips Trading Company Limited and there is one pharmacy 
company (City Pharmacy Limited). 
The government-sponsored financial institutions in Papua New Guinea may be 
categorised into four groups. The savings and loan societies and microfinance financial 
intermediaries were established to promote integration with the formal sector through 
savings and credit mobilisation. Although established during the 1960s with the 
assistance of the Australian Reserve Bank, the savings and loan societies have had a 
chequered history, mainly as a result of fraud and mis-management (Bank of Papua New 
Guinea 1998:141). Out of the 189 societies during the 1970s, there were only seventeen 
active savings and loan societies still in existence in 2002. The first microfinance pilot 
project in Papua New Guinea (LikLik Dinan Arbitore Trust) failed and was closed in 
2003. With the support of the Asian Development Bank and Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID) a new microfmance project as a micro-finance 
bank providing both savings and loan services was launched in 2004 (The National 
2004). 
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The second group of government-sponsored financial organisations 1s focused 
exclusively on cheap credit delivery. Included in this group is the Papua New Guinea 
Development Bank (now called the Papua New Guinea Rural Development Bank), which 
was established in 1967 as a specialist lender of subsidised credit and provider of 
management services. The bank has suffered from political interference and poor 
management (Kannapiran 1995) and its future is currently being debated.6 There also 
exist micro-credit schemes for targeted clientele that are sponsored by donors, local 
politicians, and government departments and agencies but which are charmelled through 
the Papua New Guinea Rural Development Bank (Kavanamur 2002; Papua New Guinea 
Rural Development Bank Limited 2000:12-14). 
The third group of government-sponsored organisations compnses credit guarantee 
schemes. Initiated in 1977, these schemes, which are administered by the Department of 
Finance, guarantee commercial banks up to eighty percent of the total loan repayment in 
the event of default (Bank of Papua New Guinea 1998:148; Kavanamur 2002:36). These 
schemes and others like cooperatives are no longer operational. 
The fourth group of government interventions in the financial system combines credit and 
training operated in partnership with commercial banks, the central bank and the Small 
Business Development Corporation. This scheme, established in 1991, had access to 
funds from the Small Business Credit Facility that were deposited in the Bank of Papua 
New Guinea. The loans were made available through the participating commercial banks 
at discounted interest rates but the applicant had to complete a business, accounting and 
6 In 2004, Papua New Guinea's two daily newspapers (Post-Courier and The National) widely reported on 
loan defaults, write-offS, investigations, and calls for a review of the PNGRDB. 
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management training course provided by the Small Business Development Corporation. 
The Small Business Development Corporation has largely failed and with it the guarantee 
facility (Kavanamur 2002: 17-20). 
The Bank and Financial Institutions Act (No 2 of 2000) was amended in 2000 
(Government of Papua New Guinea 2000). The new-look Act emphasises prudential 
regulation and increased independence of the central bank. The central bank supervises 
Microfmance and Savings and Loans Societies because they mobilise savings as well as 
credit. These two intermediaries are examples of line BLI in Figure 2.4 as they promote 
integration with the commercial banks. The superannuation and insurance funds serve the 
market segment between B8 and the ::fl. 
3.2 Survey data - Hoskins project smallholder farmers 
Agriculture is the main source of livelihood and income for the 85 percent of Papua New 
Guineans who reside in rural areas cultivating mostly customary land, which makes up 97 
percent of the total land area in Papua New Guinea (Hanson et al. 2001 :11-12). The 
smallholder sector is dominant in the production of the four principal agricultural export 
crops: coffee, copra, cocoa and oil palm (Hanson et al. 2001:12). Between 1984 and 
2003, the agriculture sector contributed 22 percent of total exports.7 Oil pahn, which is 
produced in four provinces and five projects, has since 2000 become the leading 
agricultural export crop (see Figure 3.1). 
7 This figure of 22 percent is author's calculation using data from the Bank of Papua New Guinea, 
Quarterly Economic Bulletin, (various issues, 1984 to 2003). 
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Figure 3.1 Decomposition of Value of Agricultural Exports, Papua New Guinea 
(1982-2003) 
---+---Cocoa -Tea --Coffee - · · - Copra 
---Copra Oil · · · · · ·Palm Oil - Rubber - -Other 
Source of Data: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, (Various 
Issues, 1982-2003). 
Borrowers who are smallholder oil palm growers from the Hoskins project in West New 
Britain Province were chosen as subjects for the survey because of the structural set-up of 
the project. This structural set-up allows the testing of the predictions of the theoretical 
framework and provides information with which to answer the research questions. 
The oil palm sector set-up is different from those of the other three major tree crops 
(coffee, cocoa and copra) because of the nucleus-estate farm model adopted. In this 
model, there is an estate sector that owns the plantations and the processing facility, and 
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exports its output. Surrounding this nucleus estate is the smallholder sector, which is 
provided with technical and market access by the estate sector (Christensen 1986:136). 
This set-up allows smallholders access to research and development, milling and 
exporting facilities, transportation, and extension services. Access to education, health 
and credit services were originally an integral part of this scheme (Hulme 1984:240). 
Growers in the Hoskins, Bialla and Popondetta projects have smallholder growers 
cultivating land with and without formal land titles while New Ireland and Milne Bay 
projects have growers only on land without formal titles (Koczberski et al.2001:4-10). 
The Hoskins and Bialla projects are located in West New Britain Province, the 
Popondetta project is in Oro Province, the Milne Bay project is in Milne Bay Province, 
and the New Ireland project is in New Ireland Province (see Map 1 ). 
The smallholder oil palm growers from the Hoskins project were selected for the survey 
because it was the first oil palm project; established in 1967 (Hulme 1984:238).8 It is also 
now the biggest project in the country. Figure 2.3 shows that 48 percent of the total Fresh 
Fruit Bunch (FFB) production in Papua New Guinea in 2003 came from the Hoskins 
project.9 
8 The sequential order in which the different oil palm projects were established is as follows: Hoskins in 
1967, Bialla in 1972, Popondetta in 1976, Milne Bay in 1985 and New Ireland in 1998 ( Koczberski 
2001:4-10). 
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Map 1 Map of Papua New Guinea 
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9 FFB is the name given to the bunch of oil palm fruits. 
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Figure 3.2 Decomposition of Total Fresh Fruit Bunch Production in 2003 by Project 
New Ireland 
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Source of data: Ian Orrell, Email Comm, Director PNGOPRA, I December 2004. 
Furthermore, it is the most successful oil palm project in the country because New Britain 
Palm Oil Limited (NBPOL), the company that owns the Estate sector, milling and export 
facilities and buys smallholder FFB is listed in the Port Moresby Stock Exchange since 
2001 (New Britain Palm Oil Limited 2001 :7). There are three further reasons for 
choosing this project. There exists a computerised database detailing planting, 
production, income, and credit information for each grower. Second, income from the 
sale of pahu production is paid into baok accounts. Third, the Estate Company sponsors a 
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credit scheme through which farmers are provided tools and inputs in advance and 
repayments are made through deductions from palm income. 
Furthermore, a diverse range of financial institutions has operated in this area. Friends 
and relatives, rotating savings and credit associations, less organised moneylenders, and 
the in-kind credit scheme sponsored by the Estate Company constitute the informal sector 
institutions. Within the formal sector, there are two commercial banks. Government 
sponsored financial institutions include two savings and loan societies, a branch of the 
Papua New Rural Development Bank, and a Women's Micro-Credit Scheme. 
The advantages and characteristics discussed above make the smallholder oil palm 
growers from the Hoskins project an ideal population from which to generate the data 
required for the empirical analysis. It was anticipated that the access costs to borrowers 
would be low because all growers have access to a transport network and bank accounts. 
It was also expected that differences in the property rights enviromnent should lower 
costs for farmers with formal land titles as compared to those without formal titles. 
3.2.1 The survey and the questionnaire 
The smallholder sample was stratified by land tenure differences because this is the only 
factor that differentiates the smallholder oil palm grower population. All have the same 
level of access to roads, markets, extension services, transportation, schools, health 
facilities and bank accounts. Table 3.1 provides the population and sample selection.10 
10 There is a slight difference in the total population between this list and others. This is because the sample 
was generated using the 'already-planted' database. Although the OPIC Hoskins Project Manager had a 
monthly updated file, it was a working file. Furthermore, the 'others' category included farms owned by 
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Officially, there are two types of growers - Land Settlement Settlers (LSS) and Village 
Oil Palm (VOP) growers. During the field survey a third group - customary purchase 
(CP) growers - was identified. With the assistance of OPIC extension officers, CP 
growers were separated from the VOP list. 
Table 3. 1 Sample Selection • 
Population Sample** 
Land State Settlement 1788 48 (3) 
Village Oil Palm 2808 48 (2) 
Customary Purchase 334 32 (10) 
Others 15 
Total Population 4930 128 (3) 
* Figures in brackets are percentage of the sample for each category from the smallholder 
oil palm grower population in the Hoskins project. 
* * Numbers in the sample selected are comparable across the three types of land tenure. 
Source of data: OPIC11 
churches and schools. However, these were excluded from the sample because they were owned by a group 
and were few in number. 
11 There is a computerised database available through OPIC and the NBPOL's Smallholder Affairs 
Division. These two organisations allowed the author to access that database and so the sample was 
selected from this database. Any data from that database used in the thesis will be referred to as data from 
OPIC and SAD. 
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3.3 Survey sample 
Officially, LSS growers are settlers from other parts of the country brought in to settle 
and develop oil palm (details are provided in Chapter 5). The VOP growers are from the 
local customary land owning community. 
This study identified CP growers as growers originally not from the local community and 
having no customary relationship with the local communities. CP growers who have 
married into the local communities were defmed as part of the VOP list. 
The sample was chosen by random sampling (Deaton 1997:38) stratified by land tenure. 
The selected sample size is as follows: 48 LSS, 48 VOP and 32 CP. Thirty extra growers 
from each group were selected as reserves for replacement during the survey. The reserve 
list was used when the first selected growers were difficult to find, either because they 
were out of the province, in hospital, or could not be found after making three attempts. 
A sample of the survey questionnaire used in the survey is attached as Appendix A. The 
questionnaire was designed to capture the credit behaviour of these farmers and the 
variables that determine the effective interest rate. It was adopted from Dat (1998:100-
106) with some modifications. The questionnaire is in seven parts. Section A constitutes 
grower identification. Section B profiles the socio-economic features of farmers and their 
households. Section C captures details of the oil palm block covering its history, area, 
production, income, income distribution, and status of land title. Section D captures the 
credit behaviour of farmers, focusing on the source of loans, costs associated with each 
loan application, loan term and loan amount. Section E asks for the reasons for not 
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borrowing. Section F documents the assets accumulated by farmers. Finally, section G 
investigates links with commercial banks and other financial intermediaries. 
3.3.1 Main characteristics of the sample 
LSS and CP growers are to be found in the area surrounding Kimbe town while VOP 
growers blocks extend outwards towards the coast, both east (Koimomu) and west 
(Talasea) ofKimbe town and inland towards Buvusi, as depicted in Map 2. 
Map 2 Map of West New Britain Province 
- Dividing line between Blalla Smallholders (east) 
and Hoskins Smallholders (west) 
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Table 3.2 presents the main characteristics of a sample household. The average age of a 
smallholder oil palm grower is 43. This age category reflects the dominance of second 
generation farmers, especially for the LSS. 
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Table 3.2 Characteristics of Sample Households * 
Land State Village Oil Customary Sample 
Settlement Palm Purchase 128 
(48) Total (48) Total (32) Total {Total) 
Age of principal farmer** 
Oldest 80 74 77 80 
Average 45 41 42 43 
Youngest 23 23 22 22 
Gender 
Male 40 (83) 43 (90) 32 (100) 115 (90) 
Female 8 (17) 5 (10) 0 (0) 13 (10) 
Education (Years of Schooling) 
Highest 17.4 14 15.5 17.4 
Average 5.6 7.4 6.9 6.6 
Lowest 0 0 0 0 
Household Size 
Highest 29 15 34 34 
Average 12 8 12 11 
Lowest 3 I 1 1 
Dependents 
Highest 18 10 30 30 
Average 6 4 5 5 
Lowest 1 0 0 0 
* Figures in brackets are percentages of the sample total for each category. 
** The principal farmer is the interviewee. The Harvest Card issued by OPIC is in this 
persons name and OPIC recognises this person as the principal farmer. 
Source: Survey data, 2003. 
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With respect to the gender decomposition, only 10 percent of the growers in the sample 
are female. Male domination in the LSS farms was expected because the initial farmers 
were settler male farmers with their nuclear families (see details in Chapter 5). However, 
the low female participation among VOP growers contradicts expectations because the 
traditional land tenure rights amongst the Nakanai (East of Kim be) community are vested 
in women, and they also have matrilineal land inheritance rights. The CP growers are 
males with paid employment, children ofLSS block holders, and retirees. 
The educational level, as measured by the number of years spent in school, on average is 
seven years. As mentioned, primary schools were established as an integral part of 
nucleus-estate development. The data reveals that the majority of the children of the 
original farmers did not continue education beyond primary level. 
The average number of block residents in a LSS and CP block is twelve, including 
different households, especially comprising married children and their families. VOP 
growers live in villages that are usually distant from the farms. The average number of 
family members who benefit from the oil palm farm is eight. The sample average number 
of beneficiaries per farm is eleven. Almost fifty percent (five) of them are dependents 
who are above 65 and below 15 years of age and those not able to live independently. 
3.4 Interviews and group discussions 
To complement the data from the survey, interviews were conducted with stakeholders 
associated with the Hoskins project, oil palm industry personnel, other tree crop 
industries, financial institutions, Lands Department officials, and community and grower 
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groups. Appendix B provides the list of the organisations, people, dates and locations of 
the interviews. 
3.5 Limitations of the study 
There have been several limitations to this study. Six of these are enumerated below. 
First, the empirical analysis focuses on only one industry and one project within that 
industry. Application of the model to contrasting environments could enrich the 
information collected. For instance, it would be of interest to compare smallholder coffee 
grower borrowers with smallholder oil palm grower borrowers, given the extreme 
differences between these two industries. However, time and financial resource 
constraints restricted the study to the Hoskins oil palm project. 
Second, initial intention was that the empirical analysis would be largely econometric. 
However, the small size of the sample of successful loan applicants forced the data 
analysis to be qualitative. 
Third, some major logistical problems were encountered in carrying out the survey. 
Relying on OPIC staff for transportation and identification of farmers and then meeting 
farmers at a convenient time were two of the most difficult tasks involved 
Fourth, the targeted interviewee was the principal farmer under whose name OPIC issued 
a harvest card. 12 However, the presence of deceased estates, old farmers, caretakers, and 
disputes over ownership complicated both the identification of the interviewee and the 
12 Harvest card identifies farmers and is used for recording production, income and distribution of tools and 
seedlings. The harvest card number identifies each grower. This is issued only by OPIC. 
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conduct of the interview process. Farms with absentee ownership were excluded based on 
the fact that the caretakers would not be able to provide answers to all the questions. 
Gathering of other family members during the interviews was accepted. This ensured 
transparency in the interviewing process and prevented any misunderstanding occurring, 
especially when there were disputes over ownership. Moreover, it assisted in recollection, 
which was useful because all respondents relied on recollections in responding to the 
questionnaire. 
Fifth, although the verbal interviews and discussions were extensive and less restrictive, 
access to written documents was difficult, if not impossible, in most cases. 
Finally, it is acknowledged that the sample size is small. Although the advantages of a 
larger sample size cannot be discounted, it is unlikely that the conclusions reached in this 
study would be changed by the use of a larger sample for reasons that will become 
apparent by the end of the empirical analysis. 
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Chapter4 
Borrower Transaction Cost and the 
Effective Cost of Borrowing 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter estimates the borrower transaction costs and the effective interest rate levied 
on successful loan applicants. The concept of borrower transaction cost is discussed first 
before estimating the magnitude of the borrower transaction cost and effective interest 
rate. These results are then compared with estimates derived from other studies. 
4.1 The concept of borrower transaction costs 
There is a large body of literature focussing on the role of transaction costs in credit 
allocation and the structure of financial markets. Gongales-vega (197 6, 1984 ), Ladman 
(1984), Abiad et al. (1988), Puhazhendhi (1995), and Dat (1998) are examples. 
Transaction costs are the resources required for transferring one unit of funds between 
participants (Dat 1998 :108). Both lenders and borrowers incur transaction costs. The 
efficiency of financial systems influences the level of transaction costs, while fmancial 
regulations, the internal efficiency of financial intermediaries, and the interaction of the 
demand and supply of credit influence the efficiency of financial systems (Puhazhendhi 
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1995:4). Therefore, the impact on savings and investment decisions, resource allocation 
and welfare will depend on the frictions in the economy (Levine 2004 :6). 
Empirical studies carried out in Honduras (Cuevas and Graham 1984), Philippines (Abiad 
et al. 1988), Bolivia (Ladman 1984) and Vietnam (Dat 1998) investigating the role of 
transaction cost in credit allocation and financial market structure have one thing in 
common - the area of study was operating under interest rate ceiling policies. As 
predicted by the Cost of Funds model (as well as the other two models), these empirical 
studies conclude that in an attempt to clear the excess demand, the lenders use borrower 
transaction costs as a rationing tool. Passing some of its costs to borrowers, increasing 
collateral requirements and rent-seeking by staff members were some of the ways in 
which borrower transaction costs were raised. 
The total of borrower transaction costs consists of two parts, cash and implicit costs. Cash 
costs constitute application, service and closing fees, payments outside the formal lending 
system like bribes and gifts, and travel expenses. The opportunity cost of the borrower's 
time spent in the loan process constitutes the implicit cost. The opportunity cost of time is 
substantial when loan transactions are undertaken during planting and harvesting periods 
(Adams and Nehman 1979:167). 
Borrower transactions can be taxing for small loans and may influence the demand for 
loans more than interest payments (Adams and Ghate 1992). Offering cheap credit may 
therefore not necessarily influence farmers to borrow from formal credit sources. Instead, 
borrowers will decide on the basis of the total cost, that is, the sum of transaction costs 
plus interest payments (Ladman 1984). The size of the loan demanded determines the 
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borrowers' choice of lender. Borrowers demanding small loans will prefer to borrow from 
lenders who charge a higher interest rate but impose lower borrower transaction costs. 
The converse will be true for those demanding large loans. Dat (1998:124) showed 
empirically that small loan borrowers rely on informal financial intermediaries while 
large loan borrowers rely on formal financial sources. 
Estimating the effective cost of credit to borrowers is one way of looking at the effects of 
borrower transaction costs on the cost of credit. The magnitude of the borrower 
transaction cost and the effective interest rates are quantified for the successful loan 
applicants and compared with estimates from other countries in the discussions that 
follow. 
4.2 Quantification of the effective cost of borrowing 
Table 4.1 presents the credit behaviour of these growers. Of all the financial institutions 
that operate within the Hoskins project area discussed in Chapter 3, commercial banks, 
Papua New Guinea Rural Development Bank (PNGRDB) and the in-kind credit scheme 
sponsored by the Estate Company were the only sources of investment loans. 13 
This section quantifies borrower transaction costs and the effective interest rate for 
applicants to the banks - the two commercial banks and the PNGRDB. The quantification 
of borrower transaction costs and effective interest rates for the in-kind credit scheme 
was omitted for the reasons discussed in section 4.4. 
13 The Questionnaire asked for investment loans only. 
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Table 4.1 Credit Activities * 
Items Land State Village Oil 
Settlement Palm 
Borrowers from In-Kind 48 (100) 48 (100) 
Credit Scheme 
Applicants to PNGRDB 6 (13) 16 (33) 
Successful Applicants 1 (17) 1 (6) 
withPNGRDB 
Applicants to 2 (4) 4 (8) 
Commercial Banks 
Successful Applicants 1 (50) 2 (50) 
with Commercial Banks 
* Figures in brackets are percentages of the total for each category. 
Source: Survey Data, 2003. 
Customary 
Purchase 
32 (100) 
17 (53) 
0 (0) 
2 (6) 
1 (50) 
Forty-seven growers submitted loan applications to the three banks -Westpac Bank (PNG 
Ltd), Bank South Pacific Ltd and the PNGRDB. The PNGRDB received the majority - 39 
applications. Village oil palm (VOP) growers and customary purchase (CP) growers were 
the main applicants to the PNGRDB, seeking loans for building homesteads but only one 
from each group succeeded. The one successful LSS applicant used this loan for the 
construction of a trade store and liquor outlet within the premises of his oil palm block. 
The bank rejected the rest, including all 17 of the customary purchase (CP) applications. 
Two of the rejected applicants had applied for Kl million and K300,000 to develop large 
scale smallholder oil palm blocks on customary land. 
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The two commercial banks received eight applications; four applications from the VOP 
growers and two each from CP and LSS growers. Loan approvals by the commercial 
banks were fifty percent from each type of grower. 
In total there were only six successful loan applicants - two from the PNGRDB and four 
from the commercial banks. This sample of successful loan applicants is too small for 
quantitative analysis. Therefore, the analysis in this chapter and the two chapters that 
follow is restricted to qualitative analysis. 
4.2.1 Quantification of borrower transaction costs 
Borrower transactions for the six successful applicants are quantified in this section.14 
There are three components of the total borrower transaction cost: 
(1) Fees and charges, which consist of application, establishment, and administration 
costs and stamp duty fees. 
(2) Transport and miscellaneous costs include travel expenses incurred while making 
arrangements for the loan and miscellaneous expenditure on food, soft drinks, 
betelnut and cigarettes, and inducement fees paid to those who assist in completing 
the application form or bank staff paid during the loan application.15 
14 Borrower transaction costs for the rejected applicants are excluded because the maximum borrower 
transaction cost is incurred up to the disbursement of the loan. 
15 It was easier to ask growers to include inducement costs as part of their miscellaneous expenses because 
inducement offers were generally in the form of in-kind payments like the offer of lunch, soft drinks, 
cigarettes and betelnuts. 
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(3) The opportunity cost of time measured as the cost of working days lost. 16 This is the 
cost of employing someone to carry out work that has to be done while the 
arrangements are made for the loan or the income lost from an activity that was 
forgone during the loan application process.17 
The sum of the first two components constitutes the cash expenses incurred in dealing 
with the loan while the opportunity cost of time constitutes the implicit component. The 
total borrower transaction cost is the sum of both cash and implicit costs. Table 4.2 shows 
the components of the total borrower transaction cost separated into the two types of 
banks: commercial banks and the PNGRDB. 18 
Analysis in terms of grower type is excluded for two reasons. First, the two commercial 
banks did not accept farmland with formal titles as loan collateral. Second, the PNGRDB 
as a lender of subsidised credit generally lends to the smallholder sector without requiring 
land with formal titles as loan collateral. Jointly, these two factors imply that the 
stratification of the sample in terms of land tenure differences failed to produce the 
anticipated result. It was anticipated that farmers with formal land titles would have 
increased access to formal sector credit, compared to those without formal titles, because 
they can mortgage on their land title deeds. The factors behind this result will be 
discussed in Chapter 5 but with respect to the cost of funds to borrowers, it can be 
anticipated that it will be high because insecure land titles will not be able to lower the 
access costs as expected. 
16 Care was taken during the interview to ensure that trips recorded were largely for the purpose of 
obtaining loans. 
17 This approach to measuring the cost of working days lost is adopted from Dat (1998: 111-115). 
18 The commercial banks are the Bank South Pacific Ltd and Westpac (PNG) Ltd. 
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Table 4.2 Distribution of Borrower Transaction Cost by Bank • 
Bank Fees & Charges Transport & Cash Cost Cost of Working 
(A) Miscellaneous (C) = days Lost 
(B) (A)+ (B) (D) 
Commercial 644 (51) 157 (12) 801 (63) 465 (37) 
Banks 
PNGRDB 200 (14) 483 (34) 683 (48) 750 (52) 
• Figures in parentheses indicate percentages of the total transaction cost of borrowing 
and figures in rows indicate amount in Kina. 
Source: Author's calculations, based on survey data, 2003. 19 
At the time of the survey the PNGRDB had funds from the National Government's 
Smallholder Agricultural Credit Scheme (SACS), which was established in 1996 (Papua 
New Guinea Rural Development Bank Limited 2000:12-13). From a total ofKlO million, 
the smallholder oil palm sector was allocated K2.5 million in 1997 (Badira et a/.nd:l-2). 
The lending rate is fixed at five percent per annum, no formal collateral is demanded, and 
the maximum loan is Kl 0, 000 for a maximum term of 10 years (Badira et al.nd: 1-2). An 
interest rate of five percent per annum is lower than the average commercial bank lending 
interest rates, which for the period between 2002 to June 2003 that the questionnaire 
focussed on were above 10 percent per annum (Bank of Papua New Guinea 2003: S24). 
This low interest rate typifies the interventionist policies described in Chapter 2. The low 
interest rate created excess demand as predicted, because PNGRDB received 83 percent 
19 Interviews with bank lending officers in Kim be and brochures the Bank staff provided assisted in 
confirming fees and charge costs. 
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of the loan applications but rejected 95 percent of them. This contrasts with the two 
commercial banks that received 17 percent of the loan applications, with a rejection rate 
of 5 0 percent. 
To clear this excess demand, the PNGRDB used borrower transaction costs as a rationing 
device. Borrower transaction costs for the commercial banks were split as follows: 63 
percent cash costs and 37 percent cost of working days lost (see Table 4.2). In contrast, 
for the PNGRDB, 52 percent of the total borrower transaction cost was the cost of 
working days lost and 48 percent was cash costs. The commercial bank applicants spent 
51 percent of the total borrower transaction cost on fees and charges compared to 
PNGRDB's 14 percent. In contrast, transport and miscellaneous costs constituted 34 
percent of the total borrower transaction cost for the PNGRDB compared to 12 percent 
for the commercial banks. This difference in the composition of borrower transaction 
between commercial bank and PNGRDB borrowers demonstrates that the PNGRDB used 
borrower transaction costs as a rationing device. The strategy used to raise the cost was to 
increase the number of trips an applicant had to make to the bank. This increased both 
transport and miscellaneous costs and the opportunity cost of time for PNGRDB loan 
applicants. A PNGRDB applicant made seven trips on average as compared to two for 
commercial bank applicants.20 
Table 4.3 presents borrower transaction costs decomposed into three loan sizes that 
correspond to the loan sizes available to the smallholder oil palm growers in the Hoskins 
20 Two other possible reasons exist for the higher number of trips. First is rent seeking strategy used by 
individual PNGRDB staff members. Second is the imbalance between cash-inflow (repayments) and cash-
outflow (loans) given the fixed amount of loanable funds used in a rotational system 
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project. These were the in-kind credit scheme's quota allocation of K2,000. The 
PNGRDB has small agricultural loans under Kl 0,000 (SACS fund is in this category) 
and large agricultural loans with a minimum of Kl0,000 (Papua New Guinea Rural 
Development Bank 2000: 9-10). Commercial bank personal loans ranged between 
Kl,000 (Bank South Pacific 2004) and K20,000 or above (Westpac Bank (PNG Limited) 
2003 :7). The commercial banks could give large loans under their business, housing and 
trade loans. However, these loans were much larger than those required by smallholder 
oil palm growers. Furthermore, the banks' loans officers interviewed in Kimbe said 
commercial banks had classified the smallholder growers as being eligible for personal 
loans only. 
Apart from establishment and stamp duty fees that vary with loan size, the bulk of 
borrower transaction costs are the same irrespective of loan size (Dat 1998:118-119). 
This explains the positive association between total borrower transaction costs and loan 
size, as depicted in Table 4.3. 
The key result is in the last column that shows the borrower transaction cost per kina. The 
total borrower transaction cost per kina borrowed decreases with loan size. This result 
supports the theoretical prediction in Chapter 2 that the cost of funds decreases with loan 
size. Past empirical studies support this relationship (Dat 1998; Ladman 1984; Abiad et 
al. 1988). This result also supports the finding that the borrower transaction cost has a 
penalising impact on small loan borrowers (Dat 1998:119). 
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Table 4.3 Distribution of Loans by Transactions Costs of Loan Size 
Loan Size Number Total Borrower Transaction 
(Kina) of Cost 
Borrowers (Kina) 
------~·~·--··- -.-·----·· 
Upto2000 2 781.9 
2001-10,000 3 916.1 
10,001 and over 1 1000 
Source: Author's calculations, based on survey data, 2003. 
Ratio of Transactions 
Costs to loan size 
(Percentage) 
37.27 
7.78 
5.00 
4.2.2 Comparison of borrower transaction cost estimates with other studies 
In Table 4.4 the estimates of the components of borrower transaction costs from this 
study are compared with the results from studies in four other developing countries. In all 
countries, more than 50 percent of the total borrower transaction cost is cash costs. 
Table 4.4 Comparison of Borrower Transaction Costs with Costs in Other 
Countries 
Country Cash outlays Cost of workdays lost 
(Percentage) (Percentage) 
Bangladesh 51.7 48.3 
Bolivia 69.7 30.3 
Philippines 81.1 18.9 
Vietnam 57.5 42.5 
Papua New Guinea 55 45 
Sources: Dat (1998, Table 5.2:117) and author's calculation, based on survey data, 2003. 
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Cash costs are high for the Philippines (81.1 percent) as well as for Bolivia (69.7 
percent). Costs for Papua New Guinea, at 55 percent are between Bangladesh (51.7 
percent) and Vietnam (57.5 percent). 
Table 4.5 decomposes borrower transaction costs into percentage of the loan amount and 
as a proportion of the interest rate charged for seven developing countries. 21 Bangladesh 
is excluded following Abiad et al. (1988:31) and Dat (1998: 119) because the results 
were extreme. 22 
Table 4.5 Comparison of Borrower Transaction Costs for Selected Countries 
Country Transaction Cost as a percentage Transaction cost as a percentage 
of loan amount (sample average) of interest rate (sample average) 
Bangladesh 21.7 180.8 
Ecuador 2.8 22.9 
Honduras 3 23.1 
Panama 5.2 46.4 
Peru 1.2 4 
Philippines 3.1 17.4 
Vietnam 1.65 6.45 
Papua New Guinea 16.68 52.3 
Source: Abiad et al.(1988:31 ); Dat (1998: 120) and Author's calculations, based on survey 
data, 2003. 
21 Abiad et al. (1988) were the first to summarise the results for 6 countries and then Dat (1998) used that 6 
to compare with the results for Vietnam. 
22 Unusually small loan size and relatively low nominal interest rates were the reasons for the extreme 
results in Bangladesh (Abiad et al. 1988:31 ). 
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Papua New Guinea leads in both measurements - 16 .68 percent in terms of borrower 
transaction costs as a percentage of loan amounts and 52.3 per cent in terms of the 
proportion of interest rates charged.23 Second to Papua New Guinea in both 
measurements is Panama at 5.2 percent and 46.4 percent, respectively. Peru is the lowest 
with 1.2 percent and 4 percent, respectively. 
4.3 Quantification of effective interest rates 
The demand for credit is partitioned at the loan volume where borrowers are indifferent 
to lenders. This is the point where the effective cost of borrowing from alternative 
sources is equal. The partition referred to in Dat (1998:124) was between the formal and 
informal financial lenders. The comparison of effective interest rates in this study is, 
however, restricted to the banks - the two commercial banks and the PNGRDB for the 
reason already given. 
Table 4.6 shows average monthly effective and lending rates for PNGRDB and the two 
commercial banks combined. Both effective and lending rates are higher for the 
commercial banks. This finding is maintained when comparing the differences between 
the two rates in the last column. 
Table 4. 7 presents the monthly effective interest rates, which have been constructed for 
three loan brackets as in Table 4.3. The results show that the effective monthly interest 
rates decline with increase in loan size. This result is consistent with the case in Vietnam 
(Dat 1998: 123). 
23 The ratios were first computed and then derived the average. But the ratios are highly skewed therefore 
the average may not be representative. 
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Table 4.6 Monthly effective and Lending Interest Rates By Lenders 
Banks Effective Interest Lending Rates Difference between 
Rate (percentage) (percentage) Effective Rate and Lending Rate (percentage) 
Commercial Banks 2.74 1.33 1.41 
PNGRDB 1.43 0.94 0.49 
Average 2.30 1.20 1.10 
Source: Author's calculations, based on survey data, 2003. 
Table 4.7 Distribution of Monthly Effective Interest Rates by Loan Size 
Loan Size Effective Interest Rate 
Up to 2000 3.61 
2001 to 10000 1.66 
10001 and above 1.60 
Source: Author's calculations, based on survey data, 2003. 
4.4 Borrower transaction cost and effective interest rate for 
loans from the in-kind credit scheme 
Borrower transaction costs and the effective interest rate for the in-kind credit scheme 
have not been quantified. Following the one-week pilot survey, it was decided that 
questions relating to farmer access to farm inputs and tools from the in-kind credit 
scheme would not be included in the survey. The in-kind credit scheme is structured so 
that each grower is allocated a ceiling of K2,000 worth of farm tools and inputs. Once 
growers have obtained these tools and materials, the loan must be fully repaid before they 
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can access the scheme again. During the pilot survey (later confirmed during the actual 
survey) it was found that all the farmers had used this scheme. There was therefore no 
reason to include questions relating to the scheme in the questionnaire. Finally, the 
structure through which a farmer seeks and receives the tools and other inputs means that 
OPIC takes on the entire logistical costs. Therefore, costs directly incurred by borrowers 
are negligible. 
4 .4 .1 Operational structure minimises borrower transaction costs 
There are three steps involved in accessing materials through the in-kind credit scheme. 
First, requests are made through OPIC extension officers. They can be contacted at 
anytime, including during their weekly farm visits. The extension officer contacts the 
OPIC staff manning the database directly, to ensure that the applicant has not exhausted 
his/her ceiling amount. Second, the extension officer confirms that the requested farm 
equipment is replacing equipment that has served its prescribed economic life. For 
instance, a wheelbarrow is designated to have a I 0-year economic life and cannot be 
replaced until the tenth year. Third, the loans were designed for farms of up to six 
hectares, and tools and input materials should not exceed the set requirements for that 
farm area. For instance, one wheelbarrow is the maximum allowance for a two-hectare 
farm and two wheelbarrows is the maximum for a farm of six hectares. The check on the 
database can be done from any location as each extension officer has a walkie-talkie. 
Alternatively, the extension officer can travel to OPIC's base and confirm as each 
extension officer has a motorbike. 
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Each extension officer carries copies of the application form for the loan, which can be 
completed on the spot and signed by the farmer. 24 The extension officer then submits the 
form to the divisional manager to sign. In turn, the divisional manager submits the form 
to the project manager. Having crosschecked with the database, the project manager signs 
and submits the application form to the Smallholder Affairs Division (SAD) of the Estate 
Company. Staff at the SAD office do another crosscheck using SAD's copy of the same 
database before the manager approves the application. The approved application form is 
sent to the central supply section, which then releases the requested materials. OPIC 
divisional managers coordinate with extension officers to collect and deliver the materials 
directly to the farm. Except for fertiliser, all materials are transported by OPIC at no 
direct cost to the grower. 
4.4.2 Justifications for the negligible level of effective interest rates 
The Estate Company and OPIC claim that there are no interest charges for the in-kind 
credit scheme. The unit prices for all farm inputs are priced at cost recovery and the SAD 
is an integral part of the Estate Company. There are economic reasons that justify this 
claim. The Estate Company is the monopoly buyer of all smallholder Fresh Fruit Bunches 
(FFB). Loan repayments are deducted directly from FFB sales income. 
Monitoring monthly production through the database, the restrictions placed on weights 
allowed to be registered on other harvest-cards, and the deployment of harvest committee 
24The application form is called a 'consent form' because the grower authorises deductions by the Estate 
Company as loan repayments from their Fresh Fruit Bunch (FFB) sales income. 
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members to monitor pick-up truck drivers are strategies put in place to reduce any 
defaults on the loans. 25 
The Estate Company benefits from both production and quality improvements but the 
smallholder farm gate pricing formula (Chapter 6) excludes quality considerations. This 
implies that benefits from quality improvements go to the company. This is a strong 
incentive for the Estate Company to extend this form of credit. 
4.4.3 Comparisons between in-kind credit and bank loans 
The presence of OPIC and its database reduces information costs for both lenders and 
borrowers. The loan contract is executed by direct deductions from FFB sales while 
monitoring is undertaken jointly by OPIC and SAD. OPIC therefore takes on both the 
borrower's and the lender's transaction costs. But the borrowers indirectly pay through 
the levy ofK3.50 per tonne per farmer paid to OPIC. With the zero interest rate costs and 
negligible levels of borrower transaction costs, the effective interest rate will also be 
negligible. 
If a grower were to borrow K2,000 from the banks to purchase farm inputs, which is the 
estimated loan amount for an average smallholder oil palm block, 3 7 percent of the loan 
proceeds would have been spent on borrower transaction costs and at a monthly effective 
interest rate cost of 3.61 percent. By relying on the in-kind credit scheme, farmer 
borrowers save this amount. These are two strong incentives for the reliance on the in-
25 It should be mentioned, however, that both OPIC and SAD management reported cases of default 
59 
kind credit scheme. The conclusion that those demanding small loans prefer lenders that 
impose lower transaction cost is supported by this result. 
4.5 Summary and implications 
Quantification of borrower transaction cost and the effective interest rate was restricted to 
banks because the other financial institutions were not active in supplying investment 
credit. With respect to the in-kind credit scheme, every grower used it and the structural 
operation of the scheme leads to negligible levels of the effective cost of borrowing. The 
sample of successful loan applicants from the banks was too small to allow for 
quantitative analysis. 
This analysis of borrower transaction cost and effective interest rates leads to the same 
conclusion as from similar empirical studies in other developing countries and the 
theoretical predictions from the Cost of Funds model. That is, for a given interest rate, the 
source of the loan will depend on the size of the loan. The loans demanded by these 
smallholder oil palm growers are small. It is optimal, therefore, for them to rely on the in-
kind credit scheme where the effective cost of borrowing is low compared to the banks. 
Comparisons with other developing country results ranked Papua New Guinea high in the 
effective cost of borrowing from banks. This is a direct response to the first research 
question. 
To provide an answer to the second research question, the focus was on the factors 
impacting on the access costs that lenders charged. First, it was found that all land, 
including land with titles, cannot be mortgaged. Another factor raising access costs is the 
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presence of the SACS funds in the PNGRDB. In a bid to clear the excess demand for the 
subsidised credit, the PNGRDB requires a large number of visits to the bank, which 
raises transaction costs for borrowers. Finally, commercial banks are using the 
information from the bank accounts held by smallholders to restrict smallholder access to 
bank credit. 
The next two chapters focus on the two potential access cost-lowering attributes of this 
project-land titles and smallholder relationships with commercial banks. The results 
presented show the opposite effect to what was expected. Instead of lowering access 
costs, they increased access costs and the overall cost of funds to borrowers. 
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Chapter 5 
Security of Land Titles and Loan Collateral 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of land title security in loan demand, cost of funds, and 
access to formal sector credit by smallholder oil palm growers in the Hoskins project. 
After a short review of the literature linking property rights and finance, a brief 
background to the property rights regime in the Hoskins project is provided. Before 
discussing the ability of farmers with formal title to land to access formal credit, access to 
credit by farmers without formal land titles is discussed. 
5.1 A short review of the literature on land titles and finance 
The literature linking land titles and fmance suggests that formal titles increase access to 
formal sector finance (Byamugisha 1999; Feder et al. 1988:67; Feder and Nisha 
1999:27). Two channels are said to link land registration and financial development 
(Byamugisha 1999:4-5). One channel is the land-collateral-asset relationship leading to 
expansion in the asset base for loans and reduction in intermediation costs; the second is 
the unlocking of land resources and making them available for mobilisation by financial 
institutions. 
This chapter follows the land-collateral-asset channel because it is directly related to the 
objective of this study. The empirical analysis that follows uses the conceptual 
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framework developed by Feder et al. (1988). This conceptual framework was the first 
one developed for analysing the economic benefits of land registration. Econometric 
results using data from rural Thailand confrrmed this conceptual framework. Later studies 
expanded (Besley 1995b) and generalised (Byamugisha 1999) this framework. 
The conceptual framework is depicted in Figure 5.1. Following the direction of the 
arrows, land with title has two links. One is through the borrower's side and the other is 
through the lender's side. The borrower's link shows title security increasing demand for 
investment and variable inputs. The supply side complements this with increased supply 
of long-term investment and short-term credit. The combined impact results in higher per 
hectare productivity, which in turn raises land prices and incomes. 
The conceptual framework was based on the prellllse that credit transactions are 
inherently risky (Feder and Nisho 1999:27). Lenders advance the loan against a promise 
by the borrower to repay the principle with interest. Because the lender has less 
information than the borrower about the prospect of full and timely repayment, collateral 
arrangements become important. Collateral improves the information content about 
borrowers and guarantees loan repayments. Land with secured title is a fixed asset and 
therefore important loan collateral-in fact, the most important collateral. If the land 
titles are insecure, lenders cannot be assured that the intended borrower is indeed the 
owner of the land to be mortgaged. For these reasons, presentation of a formal land title is 
often a mandatory precondition for formal sector loans. 
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Figure 5.1 Land Ownership Security and Farm Productivity: A Conceptual 
Framework 
Bor wer 
More Security 
to farmer 
More demand 
for investment 
Input co plementarity 
More demand for 
variable inputs 
Higher land 
price 
Titled Land 
More Investment 
More variable 
input use 
Higher output 
per hectare 
Source: Adopted from Feder and Nisho (1999:28) 
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The conceptual framework outlined in Figure 5 .1 is used to analyse the survey data on 
land titles. If land titles are insecure, the flow of credit depicted in Figure 5.1 will not 
even begin. 
5.2 Property rights regime - the Hoskins project 
There are three types of smallholder oil palm growers operating under two different land 
tenure systems in the Hoskins project. The land settlement growers are cultivating oil 
palm on state land with formal 99-year agricultural leasehold titles under the Land Act 
1996 (No 45of1996). Village oil palm growers and customary purchase growers have a 
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semi-formal Clan Land Usage Agreement (CLUA) land title to customary land without 
any specific legal support. A brief review of each of these groups and the land tenure 
systems is presented next. 
5 .2.1 Background to cultivation on state land 
State land cultivated by LSS growers was originally customary land alienated by the 
Australian Administration during the 1950s (Hulme 1984:237). Reviews of the literature 
on property rights (Larmour 2002; 2003), indigenous agriculture (Cheetham 1963; Hulme 
1984; Wright 2002) and oil palm development (Christensen 1986; Grieve 1986) in Papua 
New Guinea show that the nucleus-estate model of farming used in the oil palm industry 
is a hybrid model developed out of a series of land settlement trials. Hoskins was the first 
project to be developed using the nucleus-estate farm model. 
According to Cheetham (1963:70-74), following a series of land settlement trial programs 
during the 1950s, in 1968 the Australian Administration decided to bring farmers from 
other parts of the country into a region to settle and farm. 26 Each farmer was to be 
allocated land sufficient for cash crop cultivation, a homestead, and food gardens for 
subsistence. In order to implement this plan, the state alienated suitable land from the 
customary landowners; the land was declared as state-owned and subdivided into blocks 
with lease titles. The blocks were advertised throughout the country for the production of 
cocoa, coffee, copra and rubber crops. The Land Board interviewed applicants and 99 
26 The Hoskins Estate sector was developed in 1967 and smallholder cultivation started in 1968 
(Hulme 1984: 238-239). 
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year agricultural leasehold titles were allocated to the successful applicants (Cheetham 
1963). 
The idea was conceived to instil a voluntary process towards the development of private 
property rights over customary land. It was expected that, once successful, a settlement 
family's level of living would be above that of the majority of the villager farmers. The 
increased income and the expected change in the settler family's life was expected to 
stimulate the demand for private property rights, which would engender a favourable 
attitude toward the conversion of customary land to land with formal individual titles, and 
expand indigenous agricultural development (Cheetham 1963). 
Hoskins was selected for the first oil palm project, following the 1964 World Bank 
Mission to Papua New Guinea which recommended the development of oil pahn on a 
nucleus-estate model in the Hoskins area of West New Britain and Bougainville 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1965:120). The present day 
LSS growers to be found in the Hoskins project are family members of the successful 
applicants brought in from other parts of the country, especially from areas with land 
shortages (Hulme 1984:242). All successful applicants were given 99-year agricultural 
leases for 6.5 hectares of land. It was planned that each grower would develop a total of 
six hectares planted on a two hectares cycle of three lots. According to highly 
experienced extension officers, the intuition behind this cycle of planting was to 
accommodate the flow of income to smallholder households during the poisoning and 
replanting cycle. A palm tree has an economic life of 20 years, and at the end of this 
economic life it has to be poisoned and replanted. The three cycles would provide a 
continuous stream of income over the cycle of poisoning and replanting. 
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Each grower was advised to immediately plant two hectares of oil palm and use 0 .5 
hectares for a homestead and subsistence food cultivation. Each successful applicant was 
provided loans for the purchase of tools, seedlings, farm inputs, building materials and 
subsistence until the first sale of fresh fruit bunch (FFB). The loans were provided first by 
the Ex-Service Credit Scheme (Hulme 1984:240 ) and later through the Papua New 
Guinea Development Bank (now Papua New Guinea Rural Development Bank). 
5.2.2 Background to cultivation on customary land 
Villagers were also encouraged to develop oil palm blocks on customary land as soon as 
the alienated state land was exhausted, that is, by 1972/73 (Hulme 1984: 245). These 
developments became what has been designated in this thesis as the Village Oil Palm 
(VOP) growers. 
The third group of growers identified compnses the customary purchase growers. 
Customary purchase (CP) growers are growers with no direct cultural relationships with 
the traditional landowners. This is a heterogeneous group of growers consisting of people 
from other parts of the province, from other provinces, and even foreigners. Some are 
employees of the Estate Company and other private sector enterprises, as well as public 
servants. Some LSS growers have expanded by developing a second block on customary 
land, mainly to resettle their children. Existing documentation suggests that customary 
purchase growers emerged during the mid-1980s (Koczberski et al. 2001:131).27 
27 Koczberski et al. (2001 :131) identified this from the grower's province oforigin within the VOP list. Oil 
Palm lndust!)' Corporation files document growers as either VOP or LSS. At the time of the fieldwork, the 
project manager was working on a new program to separate CP growers from VOP growers because CP 
growers are at present part of the VOP group. The definition of CP growers used in this thesis is any 
growers on customary land who do not have any customary relationship with the customary landowners. 
This is the author's definition. 
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Although they accessed customary land by making cash payments to landowners, they 
continue to pay implicit rents. These implicit rents constitute payments in cash or kind to 
customary landowners if and when the payments are demanded. Contributions to 
traditional ceremonies, bride price payments and health expenses are examples of the 
types of payments made. 
For both village oil palm and customary purchase, the underlying land is under customary 
land tenure, but each grower has a semi-formal title. This title, named the Clan Land 
Usage Agreement (CLUA), is derived through the smallholder oil palm grower approval 
process imposed by OPIC. The completion of a CLUA form is a precondition under 
which smallholder oil palm cultivation on customary land is approved. The form was first 
designed and used by the Papua New Guinea Development Bank to extend loans to 
farmers cultivating cash crops on customary land (Gunton 1974; Lakau 1994:64-65). The 
CLUA form identifies an individual farmer's claim to the land under customary law. 
Village elders sign to confirm a claimant's right to farm the land and to receive all 
income generated by this portion ofland. For loans with a duration exceeding five years, 
a Local Level Council clerk must sign to verify the identities of the village elders and the 
interested farmer.28 
Since OPIC approves smallholder oil pahn development on customary land conditional 
upon the ownership of a CLUA land title, a CLUA title falls somewhere between the use 
of informal customary land without titles and land with formal titles - a semi-formal title 
indeed. The main advantage of a CLUA title is that it lowers the likelihood of land-
28 A sample copy of the CLUA form is in Appendix C. 
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related disruptions to production in the short to medium term. However, the long-term 
security of this title is not guaranteed. 
5.3 Informal land titles and credit 
All customary land is generally inalienable (Platteau 1997:33) but land with formal title 
has the following five basic transfer rights: rent, sell, bequeath, give as a gift and 
mortgage (Belsey 1995b: 905). The right of transfer is missing with respect to the CLUA 
land titles, as is the right to mortgage. This is because the underlying land is community 
owned and is inalienable. Constraints on the sale of communal land to outsiders 
(Binswanger et al. 1995:2722) disqualify communal land from being adequate collateral. 
CLUA title is therefore insecure and cannot be mortgaged. 
This was confirmed by the reality that none of the commercial banks interviewed 
recognised CLUA titles. The PNGRDB had used it extensively to on-lend externally 
sourced and government-funded loanable funds (Goodman et al. 1985:152-153) in the 
past (Lakau 1994: 64-65 and Gunton 1974). Gunton (1974) was especially sceptical of 
the success of the CLUA title as a form of collateral.29 
Smallholder oil palm growers were also provided with loans on the basis of CLUA land 
titles by the PNGRDB with funds provided by the Asian Development Bank (Christensen 
1986:137) and World Bank. The latest World Bank-provided funds were used for 
replanting in the Popondetta project until 2001 (Koczberski, et al. 2001:155). In all 
smallholder oil palm projects (and other smallholder agricultural sectors), the funds from 
29 Although the author is aware of the fuilures because of the high loan default rate and the poor 
performance of the PNGRDB, it is difficult to establish the contribution of the CLUA to the fuilures. 
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the Smallholder Agricultural Credit Scheme (SACS) made available through the 
PNGRDB in 1996 accepted CLUA as collateral. 
Landownership may serve as a sign of credit worthiness in informal markets (Binswanger 
et al. 1995: 2699). Since formal land titles are not a requirement for informal financial 
intermediaries, CLUA titles will immensly improve the credit worthiness of informal 
sector borrowers. Access to local knowledge on the potential level of income will also 
improve credit worthiness for those who rely on informal financial intermediaries. 
Therfeore, CLUA titles will improve credit worthiness for accessing loans from informal 
lenders and government-backed lenders like the PNGRDB but not from formal 
commercial lenders. 
5.4 Formal land titles and access to Credit 
Small holder oil palm blocks with formal land titles have all the prescribed transfer rights 
- to sell, rent, bequeath, pledge, mortgage and gift (Besley 1995b:905) because the 
underlying land is state land and each block of land has a formal lease title. These factors 
should enable the growers to mortgage the land. 
However, the results from the survey revealed that the formal state land title deeds are not 
accepted by the commercial banks as loan collateral. The discussion that follows focuses 
on three factors that undermine the security of formal land title. These are formal title 
transmission problems, accumulation of land rent debts, and reclaiming of customary 
land and compensation claims over state land. 
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5 .4 .1 Formal title transmissions 
The role of land registration and the issuing of titles is to reduce the problem of 
asymmetric information, provide an institutional framework to facilitate land sales and 
assure any lender that the borrower has the right to dispose of the land (Binswanger et al. 
1995:2719-2720). The documentation of land rights accords land its credibility as 
collateral, impacts on the willingness of the lender to lend, and promotes efficiency in the 
credit market (Feder et al. 1988b). While public registers exist to assure potential buyers 
or renters that the rights they are about to buy belong to the seller, a functioning legal 
system and an effective enforcement mechanism are necessary to reduce uncertainties 
(Binswanger et al. 1995: 2720). 
The survey information on the status of title transmission presented in Table 5 .1 shows 
that 69 percent of the respondents did not have the leases in their names. Of these, 26 
percent are farming deceased estates. Three explanations are provided for this situation. 
The first factor restricting formal title transmission is the strength of the traditional 
hereditary system. In one case, conflicting beneficiaries - children, members of the 
extended family, and caretakers - constrained formal title transmission. This situation was 
common amongst farmers from the Simbu and East Sepik provinces. In direct contrast, 
informal tenancy-in-common arrangements have provided secure access and transmission 
for growers from the East New Britain province. There is no need for them to seek formal 
transmission because each beneficiary and his/her immediate family can access farm 
income and facilities on a block for a specified period of time. 
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Table 5.1 Status of Titles on Leased State Settlement Land 
Item Number of Farmers 
Deceased Father's name 12 
Father's name 15 
Interviewee's name 15 
Title Change Pending with Register 2 
of Titles 
Brother's name 1 
Husband's name 2 
Deceased Husband's name 1 
Total 48 
Source: Survey data, 2003. 
Percentage Distribution 
25 
31 
31 
4 
2 
4 
2 
100 
The combination of traditional inheritance, population pressure and restrictions on 
mobility has meant that there has been great pressure for the original farms to be 
fragmented. One way by which OPIC has formalised farm fragmentation is the issuance 
of the 'C card'. To control for tensions between parents (original farmers) and their 
offspring, this card is issued to offspring. In this way parents can allocate offspring 
certain hectares from the block to harvest and thereby earn income for his/her immediate 
family. This has enabled fragmentation of these farms while the formal title for the entire 
block of land remains under a single person's name. 
The second reason is that the formal transmission process is inefficient, inaccessible and 
expensive. Smallholder oil palm growers generally do not have formal wills. This means 
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they must first deal with the Custodian for Trust Land whose office is located within the 
Department of Provincial Affairs. Section 125 of the Land Registration Act 
198J(consolidated to no 46of1996) empowers the Custodian for Trust Land to identify 
and certify beneficiaries under customary law. 
Registration records from the Custodian of Trust Land reproduced in Table 5.2 show that 
the two provinces with smallholder oil palm growers with formal land titles - West New 
Britain and Oro provinces - are first and fourth in terms of the total number of 
registrations in the country. It is inferred from this data that smallholder oil palm growers 
are seeking to have titles transmitted formally. However, there is no data available from 
the Registrar of Titles office to confirm the number of successful transmissions. 
The probability of successfully transmitting titles is assumed to be low for the following 
reasons. The process is complex and expensive. Structurally, three separate government 
agencies under two departments are involved. The agencies are the Office of the 
Custodian of Trust Land located within the Department of Provincial Affairs, and the 
Valuer General's office and Registrar of Titles located within the Department of Lands 
and Physical Planning. The first step towards transmission is the confrrmation of a 
claimant's identity by the Custodian of Trust Land. The second step is to have the land 
valued by the Valuer General's Office. The final step is for the Registrar of Titles to 
execute the transmission. 
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Table 5.2 Registration for Formal Land Title Transmission with the Custodian 
for Trust Land* 
Province 
West New Britain 
National Capital District and Central 
East New Britain 
Oro 
Moro be 
Manus 
East Sepik 
Western Highlands 
West Sepik 
Madang 
New Ireland 
Western 
Gulf 
Eastern Highlands 
Milne bay 
North Solomons 
Enga 
Southern Highlands 
Simbu 
* These are data recorded up to September, 2003. 
Number registered 
358 
285 
173 
144 
69 
55 
51 
51 
20 
18 
15 
14 
13 
13 
11 
8 
7 
5 
2 
Source: Custodian of Trust Land, Department of Provincial Affairs, 2003. 
This process is out of reach for an average farmer educated to a maximum of primary 
education. Furthermore, these Agencies and Departments are based in Port Moresby. In 
theory, provincial representatives of the Provincial Affairs and Lands and Physical 
Plarming Departments should establish the identity of beneficiaries and value the land, 
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respectively, and then submit the prepared file directly to the Registrar of Titles for 
registration. However, in reality, the Provincial Lands Office based in Kimbe was under-
resourced and did not work cooperatively with the National Lands Office. This was in 
direct contrast to the well-resourced and better-coordinated Provincial Lands Office 
witnessed in neighbouring East New Britain province. 
In addition, there are costs for each of the three stages. The registration fee for the Office 
of Custodian is Kl 00. The cost of a Valuer from the Valuer General's Office is K50. The 
lodgement fee for the Registrar of Titles is KlOO. The total cost of K250 underestimates 
the actual costs required to facilitate the title transmission. In reality, growers would have 
to travel to Port Moresby to consult the Custodian of Trust Land, return to Kimbe to have 
the land surveyed and then return to Port Moresby to submit the file to the Registrar of 
titles for execution. The regional valuer who is located in Kokopo, East New Britain 
province will have to travel to Kimbe for the valuation at a total cost that would exceed 
K50. The actual transaction cost involved in the transmission process will therefore be 
high and likely prohibitive. 
Finally, disputes over succession have prevented formal title transmission. Formal title 
transmission has not progressed beyond the first step for many farmers because of these 
conflicts. OPIC, having recognised disputes over titles impacting on production, 
employed a former Lands Liaison Officer to mediate over the title disputes and identify 
one beneficiary under whose name a harvest card is issued. The identified name in tl1e 
card is only symbolic, as it will be rotated for the benefit of each conflicting party. This 
process has facilitated continued production on these farms and meets OPIC's objective. 
However, OPIC Hoskins does not facilitate the steps to obtain formal title transmission. It 
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is left to the farmers. AB expected, many transmissions have not gone beyond the OPIC-
mediated process. 
The literature on land titles in Africa shows that traditional transmission and succession 
systems are dominant for land with formal title (Barrows and Roth 1990; Brasselle et al. 
2002; Place and Migot-Adholla 1998). These studies concluded that formal title systems 
work well when the informal system is weak and vice versa. The results in this current 
study support this conclusion. The dominance of the customary inheritance system is 
resulting in land being converted from individual title to land with multiple beneficiaries, 
with the underlying land remaining state-owned under one leaseholder's name, while 
OPIC-mediated transmission has offered semiformal title ownership status. This trend of 
conversion will continue because the possibilities for out-migration are restricted. Return 
migration to their province of origin is difficult for most of these farmers and their 
children because they originally migrated from areas with high population densities. 
Thirty-six years have now gone by and the third generation is starting to cultivate the 
same farmland and the population pressure is building here too. This was demonstrated in 
Chapter 3 where it was shown that multiple households comprising children and their 
families are residing on the same block of land. However, to these families, their 
livelihood on the farm seems to be relatively better than any perceived alternatives. 
The literature also highlights the impact of transaction costs, lack of awareness, rent-
seeking behaviour of local land control boards and officers, and farmers' feelings of 
security with the existing land titles in the effectiveness of title transmissions (Place and 
Migot-Adholla 1998: 363-365). The costly and inaccessible transmission system provides 
a strong case for reliance on informal title transmission. At the same time, land has had to 
76 
be informally fragmented because of the restrictions on out-migration. The East New 
Britain farming community in Hoskins appear to feel secure with the existing system 
where each beneficiary is accessing the income on rotation without many conflicts. These 
divergent views underpin the multiple factors restricting title transmission. 
When the title is in a different person's name, the lender cannot be assured that the loan 
applicant is indeed the owner. The land title deed becomes insecure and therefore cannot 
be accepted as loan collateral. Therefore, the problem of formal title transmission has 
restricted 69 percent of the farmers in the sample from mortgaging their land. 
5 .4.2 Outstanding land rentals 
The efficient and equitable administration of land tax requires tl1e recording of land size, 
value, ownership, and information on productive capacity, costs of outputs and inputs for 
each track of land (Binswanger et al. 1995: 2724 ). Furthermore, land tax administration 
involves a legal framework that defines property rights and tax obligations and an 
administrative organisation that keeps an up-to-date register, as well as the capacity to 
assess and enforce the tax (Bird 1974). However, for many developing countries that 
meet the necessary conditions listed above, land taxes remain unimportant if the 
administrative or political costs are higher than the advantages associated with the tax 
revenue (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986:2724). 
Papua New Guinea has the relevant legal and administrative structure for the collection 
of land taxes but lacks effective implementation. Section 3 of the Land Regulation 1999 
(No 5 of 1999) defines the annual land rent on a State lease as five percent of the 
unimproved value of the land comprised in the lease. All the growers are aware that they 
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have land rentals to pay. However, data presented in Table 5.3 show that 88 percent of 
the farmers have accumulated land rental arrears. Non-payment of land rents has been 
going on for over 10 years. Personal communication with staff from the National 
Department of Lands and Physical Planning, whose responsibility covers the West New 
Britain province, admitted to having difficulties with non-payment of land rents by LSS 
growers from the Hoskins project. 
Table 5.3 Lease State Settlement Rental Arrears * 
In arrears No Arrears Do not know Not Asked 
42 (88) 2 (4) 3 (6) 1 (2) 
* Figures in brackets are percentages of the total LSS growers in the sample ( 48). 
Source: Survey data, 2003 
Although the Provincial Land Office is the closest authority that can enforce land rental 
collections, this has not happened. The Provincial Lands Office based in Kimbe was 
under-resourced and did not work cooperatively with the National Lands Office. One 
major disincentive for the Provincial Land Office is that land rentals are part of national 
consolidated revenue. There is therefore no incentive for the provincial land office to 
enforce land rental collection. Discussion in the next section shows that the state is 
showing signs of weakness in enforcing the laws that govern property rights. The failure 
to collect the outstanding land rentals may be reflective of this trend of weakening state 
influence and control. 
Banks do not accept land title deeds with land rental arrears because, legally, the 
Department of Land and Physical Planning can seize the land and evict the leaseholder 
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for non-payment of rental. The land title is therefore insecure and cannot be used to 
mortgage the land. This problem alone restricted 94 percent of the farmers in the sample 
from mortgaging their land. 
5.4.3 Insecurity of the underlying state land 
The third and perhaps the most important explanation for banks refusing to accept these 
land titles as loan collateral is the insecurity of the alienated state land itself. Legal and 
illegal reclaiming of alienated state land by customary landowners is common 
nationwide. Legally, customary landowners can claim compensation for alienated land 
through the National Lands Commission. Chapter 357 of the Land Registration Act 1981 
(consolidated to No 46 of 1996) established the NLC as an independent tribunal to 
adjudicate over land compensation claims. The purpose behind the establishment of the 
Commission was ' ... to give [sic.] last chance to the people to have some means of fair 
compensation for transfer of Native Land for public purposes to [sic.] State' (National 
Lands Commission of Papua New Guinea 2001 :4). 
The Commission is expecting more state land claims as people become educated about 
land compensation claims (National Lands Commission of Papua New Guinea 2001:12). 
Between 1999 and 2001, 1000 claims worth Kl 80 million in total were awarded 
(Ruahmaa 2004). 
Koczberski et al.(2001:123-130) provide a good description of the conflict between 
customary landowners and land settlement schemes in the West New Britain and Oro 
provinces. The problem is worse in the Oro project than in the Hoskins project. A move 
to evict people is not confined to one LSS sub-division but to all LSS farmers and people 
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from other parts of the country working in the main town, Popondetta. The first major 
uprising was in 1992 under the banner, 'Oro-for-Oro.' Claims for compensation in the Oro 
province are continuing, even after a K200,000 compensation package for the settlement 
and plantation land was paid in 1982 (Koczberski et al.2001). 
With respect to the Hoskins project, 173 LSS farmers from the Kavugara sub-division in 
Talasea (see Map 2) were evicted because ofa landowner uprising in 1993. The land was 
returned by the state as freehold to customary landowners (Koczberski et al.2001). The 
landowners have subsequently developed mini-estates under two landowner companies -
Kavugara Development Corporation (KDC) and Karato Limited. Discussions with the 
management of these two landowner companies and OPIC staff revealed that the state 
had lent a total of K2.5 million to the landowner companies to develop the mini-estates. 
The money was divided as follows: Kl.3 million to KDC and Kl.2 million to Karato 
Limited. Since the major incident in 1993, minor confrontations between settlers and 
customary landowners have been witnessed, even during the survey period. Such 
incidents encourage the eviction of settlers from even legally acquired land. 
The Kavugara incident appears to have had a major impact on the thinking of every 
settler farmer. This incident was mentioned in all conversations with CP and LSS 
growers. Settlers are convinced that they are farming at the mercy of the customary 
landowners and not the state. They know that the local landowners from Kavugara 
benefited at the expense of the settlers. They got the land back and were given loans to 
develop mini-estate oil palm blocks. Such actions by the state have diminished the 
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settlers' trust in the state's ability to protect them in the event of a landowner uprising. 
The provincial government is widely believed to be in support of evicting settlers. 30 
Table 5.4 depicts implicit payments made by CP and LSS growers, and the actual receipt 
of payments by VOP growers. These implicit payments consist of contributions to major 
commnnity activities of the customary landowning communities. Marriages, 
compensation payments, funerals, church building, and rituals were the main community 
activities funded. 
Table 5.4 Implicit Land Rental Payments to Customary Land Owners * 
Type of Grower Paid Implicit Does not Pay Not asked Total 
Rent Implicit Rent 
Land State Settlement 20 (41) 26 (55) 2 (4) 48 (100) 
Village Oil Pahn * * 13 (27) 35 (73) 0(0) 48 (100) 
Customary Purchase 28 (88) 3 (9) 1 (3) 32 (100) 
Sample 61 (47) 64 (50) 3 (2) 128 (100) 
* Figures in brackets are percentages of the total for each category. 
** Village oil palm grower respondents were asked if they received such payments. 
Source: Survey data, 2003. 
Although payments made by CP growers are self-explanatory, as discussed in section 
5.2.1, the significant information from the survey respondents involving LSS growers 
- -- •• I 
strengthens the argument that settlers are buying security from customary landowners. 
Although the percentage of growers with formal land rental outstanding was as high as 88 
30 The author was provided a leaked confidential provincial executive decision to evict settlers. 
81 
percent, the fact that 41 percent are making implicit rental payments is significant. This 
indicates that they are prepared to forego rental payments to the state but are keen to pay 
customary landowners. 
Landowner reclaiming of land is a nationwide problem. It has impacted on the Hoskins 
project and the state's handling of the issue shows greater weakness than strength. Being 
aware of the frequency oflandowners acting in this marmer and the weakness of the state 
in exerting its authority, commercial banks are not accepting any land with formal titles 
as loan collateral. The insecurity of the underlying alienated state land has eroded and 
weakened the security of the formal lease titles. All state land with formal title in the 
smallholder oil palm sector in the Hoskins project is insecure and cannot be mortgaged. 
5.5 Summary and Implications 
The prediction of the land title-collateral system illustrated in the conceptual framework 
in Figure 5.1 has not been realised in the case of the Hoskins smallholder oil palm sector 
because all land, including state land with formal lease titles, is insecure. Perhaps the 
most important and most unfortunate finding is the insecurity of the underlying state land 
and the inability of the state to exert authority against the reclaiming of customary land 
and compensation claims over customary land. 31 Being aware of this situation, formal 
commercial lenders have rejected land with titles as loan collateral. Likewise, settler 
farmers feel more insecure. This feeling of insecurity has contributed to farmers 
preferring informal title transmission and implicit land rental payments. 
31 Recall that the present state land through out the country was alienated by the colonial government. This 
is being claimed back by the present generation of customary landowners. 
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OPIC has assisted in title transmission to a limited extent and use of CLUA titles has 
resulted in a semi-formal land tenure system. CLUA has improved titling on customary 
land while mediated issuance of harvest cards for LSS farmers has downgraded formal 
titles to a semi-formal level. 32 All smallholder land titles in the Hoskins project therefore 
have semi-formal titles. However, no land titles can be mortgaged. Formal lenders will 
therefore increase access costs to borrowers and restrict smallholder access to formal 
sector credit. Semi-formal land titles can improve credit worthiness for informal and 
government-sponsored fmancial intermediaries. In the Hoskins project, the in-kind credit 
scheme and the PNGRDB, respectively, represent tl1ese types offmancial intermediaries. 
Insecure land titles provide one reason for the high cost of borrowing for smallholders in 
the Hoskins project and thus provide one answer to the second research question. 
The next chapter continues discussion of the results of the survey, focussing on the 
commercial banks and their relationship with smallholder oil palm growers. 
32 In section 5.4.1, it was discussed that OPIC employed a former land liaison officer to mediate amongst 
conflicting beneficiaries and issue a harvest card in one person's name, who is referred to being the 
principal fanner and also the interviewee in this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Smallholder Relationship With Commercial Banks 
6.0 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 5, smallholder access to commercial bank credit is limited by the 
insecurity of land titles. An alternative option available to the smallholder oil palm 
growers to lower the cost of funds is to capitalise on their relationship with commercial 
banks. This chapter will consider the factors that inhibit these growers from capitalising 
on their relationship with the two commercial banks represented in the province. 
Before analysing the case involving the Hoskins smallholder oil palm growers, a short 
review of the literature on relationship banking is presented. This is followed by a 
discussion on cash flows into and out of bank accounts 
6.1 Brief review of the literature on relationship banking 
There is a debate in the theoretical literature over the composition of institutions in the 
financial system. This debate largely occurs between bank-based and market-based 
financial systems (Levine 2004: 34-35). This section focuses on commercial banks 
because the smallholder farms have remained small since the project was developed in 
1968, with the average farm size of only four hectares. Therefore, access to credit is 
restricted. Commercial banks remain the only formal source of credit since the farms are 
too small to access the securities and equities markets. Interventionist-oriented financial 
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intermediaries and informal fmancial intermediaries are alternative sources to the 
commercial banks. 
The smallholder oil palm grower's access to banking services, especially transaction 
accounts held with the two commercial banks represented in the province, makes 
commercial banks a likely major source of formal sector credit. However, the survey data 
discussed in Chapter 4 showed that the commercial banks were the least frequent source 
of credit and therefore the expectation put forward in Chapters 2 and 3 is contradicted. 
This section draws on the relationship lending literature to develop a suitable framework 
to analyse the data from the smallholder oil palm growers. 
6.1.1 The concept of relationship lending 
There is a growing body of literature that focuses on relationship banking. Boot (2000) 
provides a review of this literature. The literature distinguishes between relationship 
lending and transaction-oriented lending. In relationship lending, a lender obtains 
borrower-specific information that is propriety in nature and has multiple interactions. 
Profitability of an investment is evaluated through multiple interactions with the same 
customer over time and across products. Other financial services such as deposits, cheque 
clearance, letters of credit, and cash management services are examples of multi-products 
or service provision. This contrasts with transaction lending where the focus is on one 
transaction or multiple transactions with different customers (Boot 2000:10-11). In 
transaction lending, investment evaluations and contracts are designed using the 
information available at the time of origination (Berger et al. 200la:2130). 
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The modern literature on financial intermediation has focused on the role of banks as 
relationship lenders (Boot 2000:8). The focus of this literature is on establishing the 
benefits of relationship lending for borrowers and bankers (Dahiya et al. 2003:375). 
Since this thesis is concerned with small firms, this chapter concentrates on the literature 
that links relationship lending and small firms. 
According to Berger and Udell (1995:616), one important way of defining small 
businesses is that all small firms are informationally opaque. Unlike large firms, the 
contracts of small firms are kept private, they are not publicly listed, and many do not 
have audited fmancial statements. Small firms therefore cannot credibly convey their 
quality and find it difficult to build reputations. Unlike large firms, which obtain credit 
from the public debt market, small firms largely depend on commercial banks (Berger 
and Udell, 1995: 351). In other words, informational opacity limits small firms' access to 
sources of external finance and limits them to relationship loans from commercial banks 
(Berger et al. 2001a:l). Furthermore, small firms concentrate their borrowing with the 
bank with which they have a long-term relationship (Straham and Weston 1998:824). 
This relationship enables the bank to collect private information on their credit 
worthiness. Countering earlier arguments that large banks do not have relationship 
lending with smaller firms, Berger et al. (200 I b) showed that it is the size of the market 
and not the size of the bank that matters. 
Empirical evidence suggests that small firms have benefited from relationship banking. 
The benefits to small firms are summarised under three categories: lower interest rates 
(Berger and Ude! 1995; Degryse and Cayseele 2000; Harhoff and Korting 1998); reduced 
collateral requirements (Berger and Ude! 1995; Harhoff and Korting 1998); and increased 
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credit availability (Cole 1998; Elsas and Krahnen 2000). There is consensus that closer 
relationships should increase credit accessibility but there is little consensus on their 
impact on interest rates (Angelini et al. 1998:928). Finally, the existing empirical studies 
used small business data from developed countries, especially the United Sates and 
Europe. 
Commercial banks are special because they have the ability to monitor loan customers 
through their cheque account information (Black 1975; Fama 1985). According to 
Kashyap et al. (2002:34), commercial banks perform both the lending and deposit taking 
roles because of the synergy between deposit taking and lending. Peterson and Rajan 
(1994:6) showed that the benefits of purchasing non-loan services, in addition to the 
maintenance of cheque and savings accounts, generates two benefits. First, the bank 
lender will increase the precision of its information about the borrower. For instance, a 
bank can monitor a firm's cash flow through its cheque accounts. Second, the bank can 
spread the cost of generating information across these multiple products. While both 
benefits lower the bank's cost of providing loans and services, the first will also increase 
the availability of funds to the firm. Meyer (1998:1110) states that small firms' reliance 
on the supply of credit, and on transactions and deposit accounts, enables them to pursue 
their relationship banking with a nearby bank. The relationship with a bank begins when 
the firm buys a product from the bank for the first time (Degryse and Cayseele, 2000:97). 
This implies that opening a bank account is the start of this relationship, even if the 
depositor may not have borrowed from the bank. Banks are seen to perform their main 
function of mitigating informational asymmetry (Boot 2000: 8). 
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Cole (1998) tested the relationship between four variables depicting the financial services 
bought by the borrower and the source of credit. These four variables were cheque 
accounts, savings accounts, loans (credit lines, equipment loans, motor vehicle loans, 
mortgage loans, miscellaneous other loans, and capital leases), and financial management 
services (transaction services, cash management services, credit-related services, 
brokerage services, and trust and pension services). In contrast, Peterson and Rajan 
(1994) used one variable to measure both savings and cheque accounts. Cole (1998:969) 
found that the relationship with the savings account was positive and statistically 
significant. Although statistically not significant, the association with cheque accounts 
was negative. On the other hand, circumstantial evidence from small borrowers in the 
United States shows that cheque account information is relatively more transparent and 
complete (Nakamura 1993). Using data from a commercial bank in Canada, Mester et al. 
(1999) showed that cheque account information helps banks to monitor borrowers. 
It is costly for both the lender and the borrowing firm to develop and maintain a 
relationship. A model developed by Longhofer and Santos (2000) showed that the 
profitability of an investment project will provide the incentive to build and commit to 
the relationship. In this model, the lender will commit to relationship lending if 
convinced that the investment project is profitable. Since the firm receives a share of the 
revenue from the investment project with the rest going to loan repayments, the firm 
exerts effort in pursuit of expanding the revenue base. In this framework, the firm has an 
incentive to exert effort to increase the profit margin. 
In summary, informational opacity restricts small firms to relationship loans from a 
commercial bank. This relationship will increase information about the borrower and 
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enable lenders to spread information costs across multiple products and time. 
Information, enforcement and transaction costs will fall. Borrowers will benefit from 
lower interest rates, reduced collateral requirements, and increased credit accessibility. 
However, the commitment to relationship lending must be motivated by the profitability 
of an investment project. 
6.2 Survey data in the context of relationship lending 
Results from the survey data appear to challenge the impression given by the literature on 
relationship banking. Despite the ownership of bank accounts by smallholders, the 
commercial banks were the least preferred source of credit. In Chapter 4 it was seen that 
the cost of funds to rural farmer borrowers in Papua New Guinea is high compared to 
other countries. While rejecting land titles as collateral, both commercial banks 
demanded savings accumulation within bank accounts as their most preferred bank 
collateral. 
Three explanations are provided below for the failure of relationship lending in the 
context of the Hoskins project. 
6.3 Dead capital accumulation 
The profitability of investment projects is immaterial in the context of the Hoskins 
project because of the property rights insecurity discussed in Chapter 5. Lenders and 
borrowers do not have the incentive to commit to long-term relationships given the high 
probability of eviction of smallholders by customary landowners. This situation has two 
consequences. Firstly, the profitability of the smallholder sector is immaterial to the 
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decision of commercial banks. The banks will have formed the opinion that the cash flow 
is not sustainable and guaranteed in the presence of the insecure land titles. 
Secondly, CLUA titles rendered the farmland and all improvements on the land as 'dead 
capital' because they do not have formal titles (following de Soto 2000). The land with 
formal leasehold titles and their improvements are 'dead capital' because the underlying 
land is insecure. Improvements on the farmland recorded during the survey included oil 
palm trees as the prime assets for all the farmers. Some farms had diversified into other 
crops in addition to oil palm. Commonly seen were cocoa, copra, vanilla, betelenut, and 
betel pepper. CP and LSS growers cultivated these other crops adjacent to oil palm farms 
while VOP growers had these crops within walking distance of their oil palm blocks. 
Homesteads within the farm in the case of CP and LSS growers and in the village for 
VOP growers are also 'dead capital.' Three types of building structures were recorded: 
bush material, semi-permanent and permanent constructions. Permanent constructions 
ranged up to three to four bedroom houses on high poles. Some had water tanks, 
electricity, TV satellite dishes, and telephones. The collective value of the land, palm 
trees and other economic crops, and the homestead would, in other situations, 
substantially raise the value of their total assets. Unfortunately, they are all collectively 
'dead capital.' 
There are also other assets that the commercial banks do not accept as loan collateral. 
Examples are farm tools - wheelbarrows, knapsack sprayers, harvesting tools, motor 
bikes, copra dryers, cocoa fermentaries and lawn mowers. Vehicles and generators are 
accepted only if they are new and in very good condition. Only four farmers in the 
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sample had both vehicles and generators that fitted commercial bank standards as 
collateral. 
'Dead capital' encourages transactions intermediated by informal fmancial intermediaries 
and interventionist oriented institutions like the PNGRDB. For instance, the continued 
supply of oil palm production motivated the PNGRDB to use CLUA for its subsidised 
loans and the Estate Company to sponsor the in-kind-credit scheme. The security of the 
underlying land title, the long-term viability of these farms, and asset accumulation are 
immaterial in their considerations. 'Dead capital' accumulation has improved the credit 
worthiness of these growers with informal lenders and state-sponsored-financial 
institutions but not with commercial banks. 
6.4 Monitoring of cash flow through bank accounts 
Prior to 1999, payments for FFB sales were made by cheque. Because of fraudulent 
cheque transactions, OPIC and the Smallholder Affairs Division of the Estate Company 
decided to make payments directly into bank accounts. Each grower had to open a bank 
account, facilitated by OPIC. OPIC issued an identification card and a letter of reference 
from the project manager addressed to the bank growers' preferred. Given that only two 
commercial banks are represented in the province, it had to be either Westpac (PNG) 
Limited or Bank South Pacific Limited (BSP). All banks in Papua New Guinea require an 
identification card and reference letter to open a bank account. The reason for this given 
by commercial bank executives is to guard against fraudulent transactions and money 
laundering. 
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Table 6.1 depicts the distribution of transaction bank accounts for the three grower types 
using data from the survey. In aggregate, 89 percent of the growers in the sample have a 
transaction bank account. All CP growers had a transaction account while 23 percent of 
VOP growers and 6 percent of LS S growers did not. 
Table 6.1 Transaction Accounts and Grower Type • 
Number of Growers Number of Growers 
that Own that Do Not Own 
Grower Type Transactions Accounts Transactions Accounts 
Lease State Settlement 45 (94) 3 (6) 
Village Oil Palm 37 (77) 11 (23) 
Customary Purchase 32 (100) 0 (0) 
Total in Sample 114 (89) 14(11) 
*Figures in brackets are in percentages of the total for each category of growers. 
Source: Survey Data, 2003. 
Since this is the bank account into which FFB income is directly deposited, commercial 
banks are able to monitor smallholder oil palm farm cash flow movements. A background 
calculation was undertaken to reveal the level of income that is deposited. This was to 
provide an understanding of the cash flows. More importantly it establishes farm 
profitability and cash-out flows as well. The latter provides objective explanations for the 
large and frequent withdrawals from bank accounts that have concerned the banks. Banks 
have labelled these growers 'less bankable' based on these withdrawals, which erodes the 
foundations for savings accumulation. 
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6.4.l Farm profit estimation 
Two recent qualitative studies on the Hoskins and Popondetta (Kozberski et al. 200 I) 
and Bialla (Koczberski and Curry 2003) projects have concluded that the smallholder 
sectors in all three projects have low productivity, mainly because of the negative impacts 
of socio-economic factors. This section does not estimate productivity and potential 
profits. Instead, it estimates the magnitude of farm profits under the existing farm 
management practices and socio-economic circumstances. The objective of this exercise 
is to demonstrate the magnitude of cash flows and draw implications of the use of this 
information by the banks in terms of their perceptions about the health of the cash flows. 
The formula for calculating profits for each farmer is as follows: 
:r=PQ-TC (6.1) 
where :r, P, Q, TC are profit, price, production, and total cost. 
Here, equation 6 .I is total revenue minus total cost. The price (P) is the farmgate price 
and production (Q) is FFB production. 
There is no need to use a spreadsheet to project cash flows for each farm. Instead the 
unique farm gate pricing system and the database updated monthly by OPIC and the 
Smallholder Affairs Division (SAD) of the Estate Company are utilised. This enables the 
use of actual data on production, income, price and costs. First, the farm gate pricing 
formula is reviewed and then the database is examined. 
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Smallholder FFB is priced at the farm gate price using a standard formula devised in 
1996 by the Palm Oil Producers Association.33The formula was designed to smooth out 
variations in prices to smallholder farmers (ADS(PNG) 2001:40). The formula used in 
the Hoskins project is presented in equation 6.2. 
p = A(CPOcif - US $TC 1) + B(PKOc .i.f -USTC 2) + C (PKEc .i.f - US $TC 3) 
US$/ Kina 
= PMJ .o.bPP * POR 
= MGP - (L +VAT + T) 
(6.2) 
where: 
A is the industry standard extraction rate for crude palm oil (CPO), B is the industry 
standard extraction rate for palm kernel oil (PKO), C is the industry standard extraction 
rate for palm kernel expeller (PKE), PM is Palm Products, POR is the pay-out ratio, MGP 
is mill gate price and L is levies, VAT is national value added tax and T is transportation 
costs ofFFB from the farm to mill. 
CPO, PKO and PKE are the three main products from oil palm and the ratios are the 
respective extraction rates of each component from a single fruit paid to smallholder 
growers. The Estate Company retains the remaining 43 percent. Levies are deducted for 
OPIC and the Oil Palm Research Association (OPRA). At present, an additional levy is 
being charged for research into Sexmfa, a palm disease. US$TC1, 2 ,&3 are the cost of 
freight, insurance, brokerage and shipping losses (c.i.f) per tonne for CPO, PKO and 
PKE. The acronym f.o.b means free on board, which is the export price from the point of 
33 Palm Oil Producer's Association is made up of the Estate Companies and the Smallholder Oil Palm 
Grower's Association representative. 
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export in local currency (Kina). Farmers pay the national value added tax (VAT) rate of 
10 percent. The Estate Company provides transport but smallholder growers pay through 
direct deduction. 
The practical application of the farm gate price determination process is demonstrated 
using actual price calculations for July, 2003, as presented in Table 6.2. There are six 
steps involved in deriving the farmgate price of FFB. Step] is pricing palm oil at the 
world market price for the three products. Crude palm oil and Kernel palm oil are priced 
at the Rotterdam price and palm extract is expressed in Australian dollars, with all prices 
converted to US dollars. Costs for transport, insurance and shipping losses are included in 
this step for each destination. Step 2 values the extraction rate of each product for one 
mega tonne of FFB. Step 3 converts the value from US dollars to Papua New Guinea 
Kina. Step 4 defines the pay out ratio, which stands at present at 57 percent of the 
extracted value in Kina to farmers. Step 5 deducts all the levies and adds the 1 percent 
VAT rebate to derive the mill gate price.34 In the final step, transport costs for 
transporting FFB from the farm to the mill are deducted to derive the farm gate price. The 
farm gate price for each month is calculated by the Estate Company, NBPOL, and 
displayed at OPIC Hoskins office and its divisional offices. The information given on the 
notice is similar to that provided in Table 6.2. 
The farmer's pay out ratio (57 percent), transport cost and levies are negotiated during the 
price determination process, which involves the government, smallholder growers, Estate 
34 The way VAT input credit rebates work in Papua New Guinea is as follows. First, the firms must first be 
registered. Second, to register the minimum tum over must be Kl 00,000. Virtually, all the informal sector 
enterprises are not VAT registered. 
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Sector, and OPIC. Although it was formulated to be reviewed every two years, there has 
been no review since 1998 (ADS (PNG) 2001:41). Note that the exchange rate, 
international prices and costs for insurance, shipping loss and transport to export markets 
are variable. The rest of the parameters are fixed for the duration of a formula. 
The value added from reviewing the FFB pricing formula is that expenses on levies, 
taxes, and transportation are accounted for. There is no need to calculate and deduct these 
costs in estimating profits. Costs for farm tools, material inputs, labour and land rental 
remain to be estimated and deducted from income to derive profits. 
Production (Q.! is a function of four factors of production as depicted in equation 6.3. The 
cost of each factor of production defmes TC - total cost of production as depicted in 
equation 6 .4 
Q = f(L,K,M,A) (6.3) 
where L is labour, K is farm tools, Mis inputs and A is land. 
TC = wL + rK + mM + aA (6.4) 
where w, r, m, a are the prices of labour, farm tools, farm inputs and land, respectively. 
Farm tools required by oil palm growers include wheelbarrow, knapsack sprayer and 
harvesting tools. Farm inputs include seedling, fertiliser and herbicides. The on-farm use 
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Table 6.2 New Britain Palm Oil Limited FFB Formula for July, 2003* 
Detail 
Step 1: International Price of Palm Oil 
US $Price for CPO c.i.fRotterdam 
Less $78.49 to equate to FOB 
US$ Price for PKO c.i.fRotterdam 
Less78.49 to equate to FOB 
US$ Price for PKE Australia A$110*0.6659 
Less $7 .02 to equate to FOB 
Step 2: Palm Product Extraction Rate 
Palm Product Value of 1 MT ofFFB 
Standard Extraction rate for CP0@22.12% 
Average extraction rate for PK0@2.42% 
Average extraction rate for PKE@3.16% 
Step 3: Value Conversion into PNG Kina 
Palm Product Value of 1 MT of FFB US $ 
Exchange rate US$ to Kina 
Step 4: Pay out Ratio 
Palm Product Value ofl MT ofFFB Kina 
Farmer's pay out ratio at 57% 
Add 1%VAT 
Step 5: Levy Deductions to Determine Mill gate Price 
Less OPRA Levy 
Less Sexava Levy 
Less OPIC Levy 
Less VAT 10% on OPIC Levy 
Mill gate Price 
Step 6: Farm Gate Price 
Less FFB transport costs 
Farm gate Price 
in US$ 
430 
351.51 
434 
355.51 
73.25 
66.23 
77.75 
8.6 
2.09 
88.45 
0.2695 
in Kina 
328.2 
187.07 
1.87 
1.77 
1 
3.5 
0.35 
182.33 
22.12 
160.21 
* This information taken directly from the notice displayed on the OPIC Public 
Noticeboard, Hoskins, July 2003. 
Source: Smallholder Affairs Division, New Britain Palm Oil Limited, 2003. 
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of these factors in recent years is represented in Table 6.3. Fertiliser application is 
infrequent as depicted in the fourth column. In aggregate, 84 percent of farmers applied 
fertiliser in 2002. However, the average amount of fertiliser applied is below the standard 
ten bags per hectare per year requirement. 
This problem persisted even after the introduction of a K3 per bag refund on every 
fertiliser bag applied as an incentive by the Estate Company in 1999. With respect to 
herbicide use, only 55 percent of the sample used it. The average number of workers for 
each farm is three and each person worked, on average, three hours a week. 
Table 6.3 Labour, Fertiliser and Herbicide Use* 
Farm Type Average Average Applied Average Number of 
Worker/ Number of Fertiliser in Number of growers that 
Farm Hours 2002 Fertiliser Bags use 
worked by (Bags) Applied/ Herbicides 
each worker hectare in 2002 
Land State 3 3 37 (77) 4 36 (75) 
Settlement 
Village Oil Palm 3 3 37 (77) 5 15 (7) 
Customary 4 4 31 (97) 4 24 (75) 
Purchase 
Sample Average 3 3 35 (84) 4 22 (55) 
* Figures in brackets are percentages of the total for each category of growers in the 
sample. Recall there are 48 LSS, 48 VOP and 32 CP growers that make up the total 
sample of 128 used in the survey. 
Source: Survey data, 2003. 
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There is no need to estimate the cost of farm tools and farm inputs because the database 
contains monthly data on both gross and net income. Relating to equation 6.1, monthly 
data on PQ is available from the database. The net income is the gross revenue minus the 
cost of farm tools and inputs accessed through the in-kind credit scheme. Since every 
grower uses this scheme, as discussed in Chapter 4, there is no need to estimate the cost 
of farm tools and inputs. This analysis therefore shows that the net income data from the 
income database is profit but without allowing for labour and land rents. 
Labour (wL) and land rental (aA) costs are calculated using survey data from 2003. The 
number of people working permanently on a farm is used to define the minimum labour 
used for each farm. 35 Data on the number of hours each person puts into oil palm per 
week is also used. It is important to value the cost of labour using the number of hours 
spent on oil palm because these farmers spread their time between oil palm cultivation 
and other activities like gardening, running small business enterprises, and participating 
in cultural activities. In aggregate, there are 3 workers working an average of 3 hours a 
week (Table 6.3). The national minimum weekly wage of K.24.65 (Bank of Papua New 
Guinea 2003:s39) was used to derive a 0.62 toea rate per hour based on a standard 8 
hours per week. The formula for costing labour is described as follows: 
wL = nmh * n * t * w (6.5) 
where nmh, n, t, w are national minimum hourly wage rate, number of people who work 
35 There are many forms of labour utilisation ranging from friends and relatives, multiple households, hired 
labour and rotational labour. However, the labour costed is the minimum labour force available on the 
farm. 
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on the farm, number of hours worked per week, and number of weeks in a year. 
The corresponding profit calculation corresponds to the row marked by Profit 2 in Table 
6.4. This is the profit allowing for the inclusion of land rental costs. 
LSS growers are legally obliged to pay rents to the state and customary purchase growers 
pay an implicit rent to the customary landowners, as discussed in Chapter 5. Village oil 
palm growers, however, do not pay land rent because they are part of the customary 
landowning community. This implies that the cost of land rental will be zero for village 
oil palm growers but a positive value for the other two groups of growers. The annual 
Table 6.4 
Revenue/ 
Profit 
Gross 
Profit 1 
Profit 2 
Profit 3* 
Demonstration of Profit Calculation Using a Representative Farm 
2000 
6945 
6570 
6280 
Year 
2001 
6339 
5370 
5080 
2002 
10954 
10694 
10403 
2003 
6648 
6576 
6398 
For LSS & CP: For LSS & CP: For LSS & CP: For LSS & 
6280-aA 5080-aA 1040-aA CP: 6398-aA 
* LSS is land state settlement growers and CP is customary purchase growers. 
Source: Author's calculations, based on survey data, 2003 and data from OPIC and SAD 
Database,2003. 
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land rental rate - a - is formally defined as 5 percent of the unimproved land (as discussed 
in Chapter 5) for each LSS farm but is implicitly defined aud calculated for each 
customary purchase grower. 
Discussion in Chapter 5 showed that 94 percent of the growers on state land interviewed 
had not paid land rents for the last l 0 years. This means that they did not incur land rental 
costs during the period under investigation. However, a growing number of LSS growers 
are paying implicit land rents to customary landowners, as also discussed in Chapter 5. 
The actual value of the implicit land rental payments by both customary and LSS growers 
was not documented during the survey but grower admission of making these payments 
was recorded and is shown in Table 5 .3 in Chapter 5. Being implicit rents, actual 
transactions take the form of in-kind and/or cash payments if and when the need arises. 
Although land rent costs were not deducted from the profit calculation, the actual profits 
for LSS and CP growers will be less land rental costs. This is depicted in the last row as 
Profit 3 in Table 6.4. 
To provide a summary, Table 6.4 is used to demonstrate the profit calculation process 
just described. Gross revenue and different categories of profits are in the first column 
and the corresponding figures for the four years under consideration are in the other 
columns. Gross income is the value of FFB at the farm-gate price. The net income is the 
smallholder farm profit after farm tool and input costs are deducted, that is, Profit 1. In 
the absence of debts, the gross income will be the same as Profit 1. 36 The two remaining 
36 Deductions for the issue of ID cards and production and income history for attachments for loans are 
included as expenses. Although deductions were made for the purchase of shares in the Estate Company in 
1999, they were excluded because the year 1999 is not part of this analysis. 
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profit estimations are as follows: Profit 2 is after labour costs are deducted and Profit 3 is 
after land rental costs have been deducted. 
6.4.2 Estimated Profits 
The estimated profits without land rental costs (Profit 2) for the farms in the sample are 
represented in Figures 6.1 to 6.3 for LSS, VOP and CP growers, respectively. The 
vertical axes of these figures depict profits and the horizontal axes depict individual 
farmers. Estimated profits shown in these graphs are annual figures for the four years -
2000 to August, 2003 for which the data is available. Data missing from these Figures 
may represent missing data, yet to be harvested or inconsistency in harvesting for that 
year. Reading the length depicted in each year can identify profitable years. Furthermore, 
we can identify profitable farms by comparing consistencies in the heights for each year 
per farmer. 
Profits for LSS farmers in Figure 6.1 show that LSS farms are, on aggregate, profitable. 
Profits for VOP growers in Figure 6.2 show data inconsistencies. OPIC extension officers 
reported that VOP farmers are overall inconsistent in their approach to farm husbandry, 
which included inconsistent harvesting. Lack of farm management and harvesting by 
VOP farmers was also observed during the fieldwork. Records of losses are also obvious 
between 2000 and 2003 for the VOP growers. Despite these negatives, the overall 
conclusion is that VOP farms are profitable. Profit estimates for CP growers are shown in 
Figure 6.3. Although there are some years when losses were made, the overall indication 
is that CP farms are profitable. 
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Figure 6.2 Profit Estimates for Village Oil Palm Growers in the Sample for the 
Years 2000 to 2003 
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Figure 6.3 Profit Estimates for Customary Purchase Growers from the 
Sample for the Years 2000 to 2003 
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Annual profit estimates ranked from highest to the lowest show the following trend; 
2003, 2002, 2000 and 2001. This trend is the same as the farm gate price trend 
represented in Table 6.5. Price movements therefore influence annual profits. 
Table 6.5 Annual Farm Gate Price per tonne (Kina) 
Year 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
Average 
75 
71 
142 
175 
Source: Author's Calculation, using data from OPIC and SAD Database,2003. 
In Table 6.6 average annual profits are compared for LSS, VOP and CP farms. The 
aggregate profit estimates show that smallholder oil palm farms are profitable. The 
difference in profits between the three groups of growers is explained by the differences 
in the number of hectares planted. The average number of hectares planted are 6, 4 and 2 
for LSS, CP and VOP, respectively. Profit estimates given in Table 6.6 follow this trend. 
On the other hand, profits are price sensitive. When prices fall, profits for all growers 
could be on average below K.2,000 as demonstrated by profit estimates for 2001. The 
addition of land rental costs to total costs will further lower these profit estimates for LSS 
and CP growers. 
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Table 6.6 Average Annual Profits (Kina) 
Year Land Village Customary 
Settlement Scheme Oil Palm Purchase 
2000 4280 949 3295 
2001 3885 916 1665 
2002 8049 1859 3248 
August, 6091 1794 4240 
2003 
Source: Author's Calculation, survey data, 2003 and data from OPIC and SAD database, 
2003. 
The main reason for going through the profit estimation process is to demonstrate the 
cash that flows into bank accounts and what that should mean to banks. Cash deposited in 
bank accounts is Profit 1. This is net income after deducting the costs for farm tools and 
inputs as well as the tax, levy and transportation of FFB from the farm to the mill. 
However, labour and land rental costs have not yet been deducted. 
This has implications for the bank's understanding of the potential cash flow generated by 
these smallholder farms. Interviews with staff from both commercial banks revealed that 
they were not aware that the income deposited into bank accounts is not total revenue but 
Profit l. As these profit margins are relatively high for the rural sector in general, the 
overall cash flow for these farms is healthy. The difference between the gross income and 
Profit 1 will vary depending on whether the farmer has accessed farm-inputs and tools. 
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For instance, in Table 6.4, the difference between gross income and Profit 1 was K72 in 
2003 but was K969 in 2001. 
Without having access to the complete information as presented here, the commercial 
banks' overall perception was that the smallholder oil palm farms generate positive cash 
flows. The analysis in this section supports this and provides further information that the 
income is not gross but they are to an extent profits. 
6.5 Monitoring cash outflows from bank accounts 
While cash inflows into bank accounts reflect the health status of the cash flow of these 
farms, cash outflows from bank accounts reflect the farmer's management of the income. 
The bank will treat each of these pieces of information as important in its own right. In 
the Hoskins project case, banks are already aware that the cash flow is healthy. However, 
the banks observe poor management of the income. The commonly-observed behaviour 
revealed in the interview with bank staff is large withdrawals almost immediately after 
FFB revenues are deposited into an account. 
For reasons of client confidentiality, it is not possible to access bank account details. 
However, anecdotal evidence of long queues observed at the banks and the Automated 
Telling Machines (ATM) machines each FFB pay day and the day after supports this 
view. Alternatively, savings behaviour can be revealed through the ownership of savings 
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accounts. Table 6.7 presents the distribution of savings accounts by grower types. Only 
19 percent of the growers in the sample had a savings bank account. 37 
Low savmgs account ownership supports the commercial banks' perception of low 
savings and high withdrawal from bank transaction accounts. This information has a 
major influence on the lending decisions of the banks. Banks have used this information 
to classify all the smallholder oil palm growers as 'not bankable.' Instead of lowering the 
access costs, collateral requirements, and overall cost of funds to borrowers, and 
increasing access to bank credit, the smallholders' relationship with the commercial 
banks has had the opposite result. Four explanations are provided for the large and 
frequent withdrawals from bank accounts. 
Table 6.7 Bank Savings and Term Deposit Accounts * 
Grower Type Owns Does not Own 
Savings Accounts Savings Account 
Lease State Settlement 11 (23) 37 (77) 
Village Oil Palm 6 (13) 42 (88) 
Customary Purchase 7 (22) 25 (78) 
Total in Sample 24 (19) 104 (81) 
* Figures in brackets are percentages of the total for each category of growers in the 
sample. 
Source: Survey data, 2003. 
37 Except for a few, many farmers were unable to distinguish between savings and term deposit accounts. 
For this reason, both savings and term deposit accounts are presented in aggregate in Table 6. 7. 
109 
6. 5 .1 Labour and land rental costs 
Calculations in section 6.3 revealed that the income deposited into bank accounts was 
profits with labour and land rental costs included. Farmers are entitled to withdraw from 
the bank accounts to pay for these costs, as they are an integral part of the total cost for 
running the farm. 
Although the family is the main supplier of labour, hiring of youths is common. The costs 
of hiring this labour were paid either in cash or inkind. Two common inkind payments 
used were the provision of cooked food, especially rice, or a quantity of FFB. Farmers 
will usually need to withdraw cash from the bank accounts to meet labour costs. 
AB mentioned earlier, both LSS and CP growers pay implicit land rents to the customary 
landowners. LSS growers have not paid their formally defined rentals to the state for the 
period under consideration, as discussed in Chapter 5. Implicit rents either in cash or 
inkind include contributions to landowner activities such as bride price, funerals, church 
building and other community activities as and when the need arises. Both CP and LSS 
growers will therefore withdraw cash from their bank accounts to meet this implicit land 
rental cost. 
6.5.2 Harvesting in rotation 
Harvesting in rotation involves beneficiaries taking turns to harvest, sell and receive the 
income in rotation. Earlier studies also reported this practice in the Bialla (Koczberski 
and Curry, 2003), Hoskins and Popondeta projects (Koczberski et al. 2001). This practice 
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emerged in response to the population pressure on the settlement blocks, as described in 
Chapter 5. 
Table 6.8 provides data on harvesting in rotation from the survey. More than half of the 
LSS farmers harvest in rotation. This process is a structured system of income 
distribution. The most common frequency ofrotation is monthly. However, growers from 
East New Britain, who use an informal tenancy-in-common agreement amongst 
beneficiaries, practise extended rotations for periods of between six months and two 
years. 
Table 6.8 Harvesting in Rotation * 
Grower Type Rotation No Rotation Not Yet 
Harvest Harvest Harvested 
Lease State Settlement 25 (52) 23 (48) 0 (0) 
Village Oil Palm 24 (50) 22 (46) 2 (4) 
Customary Purchase 12 (38) 18 (56) 2 (6) 
Total in Sample 61 (48) 63 (49) 4 (3) 
* Figures in brackets are percentages of the total for each category of growers in the 
sample. 
Source: Survey data, 2003. 
There are two important issues raised by this practice of structured harvesting in rotation. 
These are the rotation of bankcards and the in-built incentive to withdraw the total of 
FFB revenue deposited into the account. As discussed in Chapter 5, OPIC mediated the 
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issuance of a harvest card in only one beneficiary's name. But this was only for 
formalities because the access to income is rotated through harvesting in rotation. Since 
the primary bank account is in the name of the farmer under whose name the harvest card 
exists, the bank account is informally a joint or group account. The card and account are 
therefore used by more than one person, coinciding with each rotation. This constitutes a 
breach of standard banking practice where personal bank accounts are only accessible by 
the account owner. This constitutes a threat to the credibility of the banking system. 
With respect to withdrawals, there is no incentive for a beneficiary to leave money in the 
account, as it will be passed on to the next beneficiary. Each beneficiary therefore has the 
incentive to withdraw all the income for that month. People could open their own account 
and transfer the money to their account. However, the need to have an ID card and 
reference letter restricts them from this option. OPIC's ID card and letter of reference 
services are restricted to those with harvest cards. 
6.5.3 Cultural activities coinciding with palm income payments 
Observations during the field research, discussions with interviewees, interviews with the 
executives of the Hoskins Smallholder Oil Palm Grower's Association, and OPIC staff 
confirmed that customary and community activities are time-tabled to coincide with 
monthly FFB income payments. This is to ensure that each person is able to make a 
contribution, either in cash or in-kind. 
The common activities engaged in are funerals, transportation of dead bodies to home 
provinces, bride price payments, church building, and compensation payments for 
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victims of violent conflicts such as the relatives of the deceased and owners of destroyed 
properties. These activities are not restricted to one group of farmers. The entire 
smallholder oil palm farming community is engaged in them. Every single month is 
earmarked for an activity. The dates directly coincide with FFB income payments or the 
weekend after the payments are made. 
The landowner communities expect contributions proportional to a person's wealth, 
which is additional to what one is obliged to pay. These two components of community 
obligations are like a fixed and a proportional tax on each farmer. While each person in 
the community is obligated to support each other as part of the traditional society, those 
who accumulate prestige in terms of social networks, leadership, and wealth are expected 
to contribute proportionally to their wealth. This practice is documented in the literature 
(Platteau 2000:189-240) as a redistributive mechanism common in egalitarian societies. 
Social pressures, harassment, and ideological intimidation enforce them. Threats of 
sorcery, for instance, can be a major deterrent to private wealth accumulation in these 
societies. 
In a practical sense, one common practice observed is the use of a less structured 
harvesting-in-rotation system to meet these expectations. Unlike the structured harvesting 
in rotation, farmers also allow harvesting in rotation as the need arises (a less structured 
form). Either a recipient is allowed to harvest and access the income or the farmer 
harvests purposely to give away the money. This is one of the main reasons for the 
harvesting in rotation by village oil palm growers and customary purchase growers 
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depicted in Table 6.8. The lead farmer is in control of the bank account and bankcard. 
However, the farmer will withdraw the pre-agreed amount and pass it on to the recipient. 
6.5.4 Informal financial Intermediation 
In the absence of formal fmancial institutions, informal institutions exist in delivering 
savings, credit and insurance services. Within the wider finance and development 
literature there is a large section focusing on informal finance and such functions (Adams 
and Fitchett 1992a; Besley 1994, 1995a; Morduch 1999; Platteau 1997). 
Informal financial intermediaries actively involved in the Hoskins project area are friends 
and relatives. Savings, investment and insurance are the three services that friends and 
relatives provide. There is no national social security system in Papua New Guinea, 
formal insurance schemes are inaccessible, and law enforcement is inefficient. 
Collectively, these factors force individuals to buy security and insurance directly from 
family and friends. 
Although Table 6.9 demonstrates a high proportion of membership in savings and loan 
societies, they are largely memberships in name only. Farmers expressed scepticism 
about savings and loan societies, influenced by past fraud and mismanagement. Growers 
were disinterested in savings and loans societies and contributions to savings have not 
been popular. Many were considering withdrawing their membership. However, the 
Grower's Association expressed interest in starting a Savings and Loan Society for oil 
palm growers. 
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Table 6.9 Savings and Loan Society Membership* 
Land State Settlement Village Oil Palm Customary Purchase 
12 (25) 13 (27) 16 (50) 
* Figures in brackets represent percentages of the total for each category of growers in 
the sample. 
Source: Survey data, 2003. 
Savings and investments in informal instruments, such as sharing their income with 
friends and relatives, is a common practice, as depicted in Table 6.10. This distribution of 
income is not necessarily within the same household, but may be with members of 
different households. They may be friends from an extended family network as well as 
from social networks of non-relatives. In aggregate, 83 percent of the growers shared 
their income from the sale of FFB with friends and relatives. Village-based growers lead 
in this because they are operating within a village environment. Although the 
questionnaire asked only about cash distribution, there is anecdotal evidence showing 
substantial in-kind (imported goods, food from gardens, betelnut and so on) 
redistribution. 
Two other factors that encouraged savings and investments in the informal financial 
sector instruments are the requirements of commercial banks for opening bank accounts 
(ID and reference) and minimum balances for opening savings and transaction accounts. 
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Table 6.10 Sharing Income with Relatives Other than Immediate Family • 
Grower Type Shares Does Not Not Yet 
Income Share Income Harvested 
Lease State Settlement 38 (79) 10 (21) 0 (0) 
Village Oil Palm 43 (90) 3 (6) 2 (4) 
Customary Purchase 25 (78) 5 (16) 2 (6) 
Total in Sample 106 (83) 18 (14) 4 (3) 
* Figures in brackets are percentages of the total for each category of growers in the 
sample. 
Source: Survey data, 2003. 
Since savings and investments in the informal sector can improve credit worthiness for 
informal fmancial intermediaries, it was expected that some growers would find this an 
important incentive to withdraw from bank accounts and save or invest in informal 
financial markets and instnunents. However, the data presented in Table 6.11 contradicts 
this expectation. For instance, being ashamed is one common reason why growers did not 
seek loans from friends and relatives for investments. 38 It must therefore be the 
insurance, savings and credit for consumption argument that is the driving force behind 
sharing income with friends and relatives. 
38 In Tok Pisin 'sem pasin1 which translates to 'shameful practice.' 
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Table 6.11 Summary of the Different Reasons for Not Borrowing for Investment 
from Friends and Relatives, by Grower Type (Frequency)* 
Reasons Land State Village Oil Customary 
Settlement Palm Purchase 
Sees it as an option 3 na Na 
Sees it as shameful 4 IO 5 
Similar financial position 4 na 2 
Self-reliant 3 2 2 
Grower is a lender to others 1 na Na 
Gets assistance whenever needed 1 1 Na 
Amount is too small for grower's needs 3 5 1 
Friends and relatives will not give na 3 Na 
NBPOL in-kind is fine 1 na Na 
Fears Court action na na 1 
Fears complaints & gossip from lenders 3 na 1 
Demand quick repayment 1 na Na 
Culturally, elder does not ask younger 1 na Na 
children 
Does not like asking I 1 Na 
No one to ask na na 2 
Knows they will not give na 3 Na 
No need for credit 3 4 Na 
Difficult to ask na 1 Na 
* na means not available. 
Source: Survey data, 2003. 
One other major factor encouraging expenditure on building social networks through 
sharing income and contributing to community events is the risk of forced repatriation by 
customary landowners. Through the participation by smallholders, they are buying 
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security and insurance from each other, given the underlying threat posed by customary 
landowners. Although there were cultural ethnic differences and conflicts among them, 
LSS and CP growers were observed generally congregating and supporting each other in 
cultural and community activities, no matter where they had come from. 
6.6 Summary and Implications 
The assets that are owned by these growers are not accepted as collateral for commercial 
banks as discussed in Chapter 5. Having oil palm income paid into bank accounts could 
have enabled smallholder oil palm growers in the Hoskins project to accumulate savings 
that could be used as collateral. It could have also enabled them to develop a positive 
relationship with commercial banks. The potential benefits would be lower interest rates, 
lower collateral requirements and increased access to credit. 
The general conclusion reached by both the commercial banks is that smallholder oil 
palm growers have healthy cash inflows but poor cash management. The banks have used 
the information about the large and frequent withdrawals from bank accounts to classify 
these growers as 'not bankable.' The banks have set collateral requirements that all 
farmers must have savings accounts, land with formal title in urban centres, and own 
quality motor vehicles or generators. Access costs and overall cost of funds to these 
borrowers are therefore very high. Consequently, smallholder oil palm growers have been 
restricted from accessing commercial bank loans. This outcome is the opposite to the 
theoretical predictions set up in Chapter 3 and at the beginning of this Chapter. 
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There is a multitude of factors driving the large and frequent withdrawals from bank 
accounts. This study has categorised them into four large groups. Some are inter-related 
factors. Correcting this situation will require a multi-faceted approach. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Implications 
7.0 Introduction 
This thesis is about the cost of fuuds and access to formal credit by smallholder 
borrowers in Papua New Guinea. It set out to identify the factors that constrain 
smallholders from accessing competitive priced funds from the formal sector through a 
survey of smallholder oil palm growers in Papua New Guinea. Past government 
interventions have not led to the development of a viable rural financial sector in Papua 
New Guinea. However, no previous studies had been uudertaken at farm level to identify 
the factors restricting smallholder access to formal sector credit. Hence, this study of the 
smallholder oil palm growers in the Hoskins project, West New Britain, Papua New 
Guinea set out to estimate the magnitude of the cost of funds to smallholder borrowers 
and to understand the factors that raise the cost of funds to these borrowers and thereby 
restrict their access. 
The theoretical framework for the thesis was derived from the economics literature on the 
development of the fmancial sector, with particular attention paid to the realities of a 
developing couutry's fmancial system. For the empirical application of the analytical 
framework, the emphasis was on the determinants of the access cost to borrowers. Many 
factors determine access costs but the empirical analysis focussed on the role of land 
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titles and the farmers' relationship with commercial banks. The Hoskins project area was 
chosen for the study because oil palm growers in the project operate under a variety of 
land tenure arrangements, including formal land titles. As well, the payment 
arrangements for the sales of their output mean that they all operate commercial bank 
accounts. 
7.1 Summary of research findings 
The key prediction arising from theoretical models of behaviour in the financial sector is 
that those seeking small loans will be restricted to informal financial intermediaries, 
while large borrowers will seek loans from formal financial intermediaries. Further, 
government-sponsored financial institutions established to provide subsidised credit will 
primarily serve inefficient firms rejected by the commercial formal sector. The subsidies 
will generate excess demand for credit, leading to the use of rationing mechanisms by the 
lending institutions. 
Another prediction from the theoretical models is that informal lenders rely on local 
knowledge and existing social networks to lower information, enforcement and 
transaction costs. These factors lower the lending threshold levels and offer informal 
lenders comparative advantage in dealing with small loans. The threshold levels of 
formal lenders are higher than those of informal lenders because of higher levels of 
expenditure on information, enforcement and transaction costs. Formal lenders therefore 
will not enter the small loans market segment. 
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In testing the theoretical predictions it was hypothesised that if the costs of funds to 
borrowers in the Hoskins project were high then formal land titles and their relationships 
with the commercial banks have failed to lower access costs. The farm survey results 
show that, in fact, all smallholder oil pahn land is insecure and cannot be used as loan 
collateral and that the commercial banks have used the high level of withdrawals of palm 
income from bank accounts to classify the farmers as not bankable. The information 
collected from the field survey of smallholder oil palm farmers in the Hoskins project 
depicted a complete failure of the formal credit market to provide credit to the 
smallholders. The high rate of loan rejection and the total dependence on the in-kind 
credit scheme for oil palm farm inputs and tools illustrate this failure. 
The analysis shows that the credit market in the Hoskins project 1s segmented. 
Smallholder oil palm credit demand is fully supplied by an informal financial 
intermediary: the in-kind credit scheme run by the nucleus estate company. However, 
there is no supplier, except self-funding, for other investment demands. Farmers who 
applied to the banks for credit to increase farm size, construct houses, or venture into 
small business enterprises were unsuccessful in obtaining loans from the banks in the 
area. The study uncovered many underlying factors responsible for this situation. It is not, 
however, the result of government policies or of actions of the formal commercial 
financial sector. 
The first underlying factor uncovered is that the loan amount required for the current 
smallholder farm size is below the threshold level of formal lenders. The second 
underlying factor is the lack of collateral assets acceptable to the commercial banks. 
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Farmers are unable to accumulate savings in their bank accounts and use that saving to 
establish credit rating because of the high level of withdrawals from bank accounts. The 
high level of withdrawals from bank accounts indicates the third underlying factor. This 
is the dominance of the friends and relatives intermediating for savings, credit and 
insurance. Transactions through friends and relatives are not only expected but also 
because of kinship and other societal norms and principles that still prevail in Papua New 
Guinea society. The fourth underlying factor is that not all land titles are accepted as loan 
collateral because they are insecure. More important is the contested nature of the 
underlying state land. This alone is a strong reason for commercial lenders to reject land 
with formal titles as collateral. This also directed settler farmers to pursue informal title 
transmissions, invest in the social network and buy security from customary landowners 
by paying implicit land rents. The state has proven to be weak in both exerting authority 
and administering land with formal titles. The fifth factor is the presence of state 
interventions restricting smallholder access to credit. While the PNGRDB was rationing 
credit, the two savings and loan societies had major credibility problems to overcome as 
those farmers who had membership were not contributing and did not perceive them as 
credible sources of credit. The sixth factor is that the low educational level attained by 
offspring of original farmers has restricted out-migration in search of paid employment. 
Out-migration to any other part of the country is restricted by customary landowners in 
those areas. Return-migration to province of origin is restricted because settlers were 
originally from densely populated regions of the country where land is no longer 
available. This factor is behind the conflict over formal leasehold titles, increased 
tensions with customary landowners, and promotes multiple access to bank accounts. 
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7.2 Implications of the study's results 
The implications of the results of this study are discussed under four headings. These are 
cost of funds to borrowers, state interventions, property rights, and relationship banking. 
7.2.l Cost of funds to borrowers 
Borrower transaction costs and effective interest rates estimated for the few successful 
loan applicants indicate high, if not prohibitive, costs for loan demands of K2,000 and 
below. Comparing estimates of transaction costs and effective interest rate costs with 
those estimated for other developing countries, it was established that these costs in 
Papua New Guinea are relatively high. 
The conclusion reached in respect of the in-kind credit scheme was that both borrower 
transaction costs and effective interest rates are negligible. However, growers pay for 
them indirectly through their levy payments to OPIC. More importantly, the way in 
which the in-kind credit scheme is structured reduces information, enforcement and 
transaction costs for the lender, the Estate Company, and the borrowers-the smallholder 
oil palm growers. 
The analysis established that the high effective cost of borrowing from formal financial 
intermediaries has restricted smallholder credit access to the in-kind credit scheme, an 
informal lender. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction and empirical 
evidence from other studies on borrower transaction cost, that small borrowers prefer 
lenders that impose low transaction costs for a given level of interest rate. Growers would 
124 
have spent 37 percent of their maximum loan of K2,000 on borrower transaction costs 
and paid 2.35 percent monthly in effective interest rate costs when they borrowed from 
formal lenders. These costs are very high, especially given the existence of the reasonable 
social and economic infrastructure in the project area. 
7.2.2 Interventionist policies and their implications 
The presence of two Savings and Loan Societies, a Women's Micro-Credit Scheme and a 
branch of the Papua New Guinea Rural Development Bank (PNGRDB) is a manifestation 
of the presence of government interventions in the financial market. While the PNGRDB 
was operational at the time of the survey, the other two organisations were inactive in 
terms of providing credit to the smallholder oil palm growers. 
The analysis established that the presence of ceiling interest rates within the PNGRDB 
resulting in below-market interest rates, led to excess demand for credit from this 
fmancial organisation, raised borrower transaction costs, provided competition to the 
personal loans sections of the commercial banks, and may have discouraged savings 
accumulation. As predicted by the theory and as supported by the results of earlier 
empirical studies on the impact of interventionist policies, the PNGRDB rationed access 
to the subsidised credit through raising transaction costs, in effect by requiring loan 
applicants to make many visits to the bank during the application process. In the period 
under study, the bank rejected 95 per cent of the loan applications. 
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7.2.3 Property rights 
The presence of reasonably well-established economic and social infrastructure in the 
Hoskins project was expected to lower borrowing access costs for all growers. A further 
prediction arising from the theory is that secure property rights for land, in the form of 
formal lease titles to alienated land, could also be expected to lower access costs and 
increase access to formal sector credit for oil palm growers. 
The survey information showed that the state land lease titles were insecure. In fact, all 
smallholder farmers had insecure titles to their land and neither of the commercial banks 
in the area accepted these lands as loan collateral. The lack of formal title transmission, 
the accumulation of land rentals, and the insecurity of the titles to the underlying state 
land were the three factors identified as undermining the security of the formal lease 
titles. Of these three, the insecurity of state land-because of the risk of reclaiming the 
land by the previous landowners and compensation claims-appears the most important 
factor. 
This study therefore established that all state land with formal titles in the Hoskins project 
is insecure and cannot be accepted by the commercial banks as loan collateral. A formal 
title is not sufficient if it is insecure. Therefore effective enforcement of property rights 
by the government is crucial. The emphasis should be on the development of an efficient 
property rights system that registers titles, updates the records and enforces the rights on 
a continuous basis. 
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Another implication of these results is that the land with formal titles is 'dead capital'-
not because of the absence of formal titles as de Soto (2000) argues but because the 
formal property rights system is ineffective. A weak state, the predominance of cultural 
and traditional land rights inheritance and inefficient administration of state land all work 
to undermine the formal titles. Farmland under customary land tenure is also 'dead 
capital' because it does not have formal titles, consistent with de Soto's arguments. 
Consequently, all land titles in the Hoskins oil palm project smallholder sector can be 
called 'dead capital.' Accumulation of this capital may have improved credit worthiness 
for informal and state sponsored intermediaries but not for the commercial banks and 
other formal lenders. 
7.2.4 Relationship banking 
Access to bank accounts has not provided an opportunity for the smallholder oil palm 
growers to commit to relationship banking and benefit from reductions in interest rates 
and collateral requirements, as well as increased access to bank loans, as predicted by the 
theory of relationship banking. Instead, the high level of withdrawals following deposits 
of Fresh Frnit Bunch sales income has been used by the commercial banks to categorise 
the growers as not bankable. This result supports the predictions of the relationship 
banking literature by showing that commercial banks monitor the movement of cash 
flows from bank accounts and use that information generated over a period of time in 
making loan decisions. 
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The factors behind the large and frequent withdrawals were found to be multi-faceted. 
For the commercial banks, however, the reason (s) for the high level of withdrawals is 
immaterial to their loan decisions. But this result has implications for understanding the 
underlying factors contributing to poor financial sector development in Papua New 
Guinea. There is an argument in the finance and development literature that market 
failures, due to the absence of social and economic infrastructure, justify the proliferation 
and dominance of informal financial intermediaries. The results presented here show that 
the presence of social, economic, banking and legal infrastructure in the Hoskins project 
area has done little to weaken the dominance of the informal financial sector. The results 
discussed here reveal that farmers withdraw money from formal bank accounts to invest 
in the informal financial sector intermediated by friends and relatives. This means that 
there are other causes of market failures that make savings and investment through the 
formal bank accounts less attractive than those done through the informal financial 
intermediaries. 
7.3 Policy implications 
This study has shown that high access costs have contributed to the high cost of funds to 
borrowers in Papua New Guinea. The ineffectiveness of the property rights systems and 
of the management of income from oil palm farms has raised access costs in the case of 
the smallholder oil palm growers in the Hoskins project. 
Unless a more effective formal property rights system is developed, the rural financial 
market in Papua New Guinea will remain underdeveloped. In this environment, the 
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prohibitive cost of funds to smallholder borrowers will remain. Making the system less 
costly for farmers and others to transfer their formal titles, encouraging the adoption of 
formal title transmission rather than informal transmission, and ensuring a strong state 
system that defines and enforces formal property rights and contracts are policy options 
worth pursuing. 
Relationship banking needs to be encouraged. Depositors need to be educated that it is in 
their own interest to pursue a good banking relationship with their banks. This should 
involve savings accumulation and controlled withdrawals. The potential benefits from 
relationship lending are lower costs of funds for borrowers and reductions in collateral 
requirements and thereby increased access to credit. 
The broader policy goal for lowering the cost of funds and improving access to formal 
finance must be to lower the dominance of the informal intermediaries. Factors revealed 
by the survey data to be encouraging informal transactions include the commercial bank 
requirement of an Identification card and a reference letter in order to open a bank 
account. The absence of social security, poor law enforcement, and lack of access to 
formal insurance funds encourages savings, insurance and credit transactions in the 
informal sector. In addition to the egalitarian system of forced income redistribution, the 
underlying insecurity of land tenure is encouraging increased spending on social capital 
accumulation. Finally, the inability of grower's children to pursue education beyond 
primary level has contributed to the increased numbers living on the farm and relying on 
oil palm income. This inevitably contributes to land title dilution and consequently 
continued withdrawals from bank accounts and increased reliance on friend and relatives. 
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There is, therefore, a multitude of factors pushing these farmers towards informal 
financial intermediaries. A multi-faceted policy approach is required to weaken the 
dominance of the informal fmancial intermediaries and increase formal sector 
participation. There is a large body of literature (Belsey 1995a; Dercon 2002; Morduch 
1999; Besley 1994; Yaron 1994; Yaron et al. 1998; Townsend 1995; Platteau 1997) that 
shows that informal financial institutions are generally inefficient. 
Finally, government interventions such as interest rate ceilings, credit quotas and 
specialist financial intermediaries such as the PNGRDB should be removed because they 
are reducing rather than increasing access to credit and raising rather than lowering the 
total cost of borrowing. They are competing with the market segment of the more 
efficient financial intermediaries such as commercial banks as well as promoting 
inefficient enterprises and discouraging savings accumulation. Instead, policies that 
enhance savings accumulation should be encouraged. 
7.4 Research implications 
Several issues could be researched further to fill the gaps due to the limitations of this 
study (see Chapter 3). First, further research with a larger sample could be undertaken to 
see whether the conclusions reached in this study are supported. However, it is unlikely 
that increased sample size will change the conclusions because insecure land titles and 
poor banking records are both sufficient causes of the high cost of funds to borrowers. 
Second, repeating the research in another agricultural industry with different 
characteristics to oil palm (coffee, for instance) or in urban-based small industries might 
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offer interesting comparative results. Finally, a third research project should investigate 
the development of an efficient property rights system that registers, updates the records 
and enforces the rights on a continuous basis. 
7. 5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study shows that the current level of demand for credit among 
agricultural smallholder oil palm growers is below the threshold of the commercial banks 
in Papua New Guinea. The informal sector lender best suited for loans of this size is the 
in-kind-credit scheme. 
Relating these results to the research questions, the empirical analysis shows that the cost 
of funds is high, if not prohibitive, for the smallholder oil palm growers for two reasons. 
First is the insecurity of land titles, which is restricting the supply of credit and these 
growers' poor banking relationship. 
In the context of the wider literature on finance and development, this study shows that 
more research is needed to understand the determinants of financial development in 
developing countries. Levine (2004: 86) reached the same conclusion at the end of a 
major review of the literature on the theory and empirical evidence on the nexus between 
fmance and growth as mentioned in Chapter 1. Levine (2004:86) categorised the growing 
literature that analyses the determinants of financial development into two groups. One is 
examining the direct impact of laws, regulations and macroeconomic policies and the 
second is examining the political, cultural and even geographical context shaping 
financial development. This study has implications for both sets of literature. 
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Appendix A Questionnaire and answer sheet 
This survey was conducted between July and September, 2003. A pilot survey was 
conducted over a one-week period before the actual survey. The pilot survey assisted in 
modifying the questionnaire and designing the response record sheet. Data that could be 
accessed directly from OPIC and the Estate Company through its Smallholder Affairs 
Division were underlined in the question sheet and shaded off in the answer response 
sheet. These were production, income, in-kind credit, and planting history. The following 
is the questionnaire (Al) used to interview farmers and the answer sheet (A2) used to 
record the responses. 
All interviews were conducted in Tok Pisin and assisted by OPIC extension officers. 
Al Sample of Survey Questionnaire 
For Block-holders: 
1. Area name: 
4: BlockNo: 
2: Division Name: 
B. Profile of the Block Title Holder and the Household (Table Bl): 
1. Age: 
2. Sex: 
3. Occupation (in addition to fanning): 
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4. Level of education (in number of schooling years):39 
5. Total residents in block: 
6. Name and Number of cards block residents have (A, B, C, &D): 
7: Number of dependents in the block AO 
8: Number of block members who work on oil palm block: 
9: Number of hours in a week each person spends on blockwork (clearing, weeding, 
spraying, harvesting ... etc): 
10: Number of block members who work off the oil palm block (JdentifY each 
occupation, position and wage rate): 
11: Do you engage in any business activities on your block (Trade store, 
Poultry ... etc)? YES/NO. 
IfYES, identify each type of business activity: 
12: Total family monthly income from all non-oil palm sources (Sum of 
question 12 & 13, sale of food crops, and other sources like land rentals): 
39 This is derived by combining fue data in the highest level qualifications attained and years of school. For 
example, if a person reported fuat he/she finished two years in a vocational school and his/her highest level 
completed was 10, then his/her years of schooling is 12. 
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13: Number of children from block in school: 
14: Language group of parents/province of origin of parents: 
15: Do you have a position in the community (Block leader, Village leader, 
Association leader, Pastor, committee members, magistrate, ... etc)? 
16: How frequently do you contribute to customary activities oflocal landowners? 
C: Block Description (Table Cl) 
1: How many blocks do you have? If more than one, identify land types (CPL,LSS or 
or VOP). 
2: Do you have the lease title papers for the block( s )? YES/NO 
(i) If YES, check rent book? 
(ii) IfNO, provide reasons: 
3: For each block, answer the following questions 
(a) Total area (hectares-mainly CP &LSS): 
(b) Area under Oil Palm (hectares): 
( c) Year when block first developed: 
"'Dependents are defined as those under 15 or above 65 years ofage and those unable to live 
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(d) Year when block ex_panded and by how many hectares? 
(tl Year when block replanted and by how many hectares? 
ill How many bags of fertiliser did you apply last year? 
{g)_ How many times did you apply weedicide last year? If no weedicide used, how many 
times did you clear undergrowth last year? 
® Do you use hired labour in your block? If yes, state number and wage rate. 
ill Do you have any of the following and is what you have enough for your block?: 
(i) Wheelbarrow 
(ii) Badang (small tractor) 
(iii) Harvesting kit (pole -Sm, I Om, 12, & I 4m, harvesting sickles, harvesting 
chisels, file & oil stone) 
(iv) Spray Kit (knapsack sprayer, weedicide, overalls, gum boots, hand gloves, 
facial mask, and goggles). 
ill Did you seek advice from OPIC on any oil palm related matter last year (2002)? If 
YES, how many times? 
(kl How many of the meetings organised by OPIC last year (2002) did you attend? 
ill How many tonnes ofFFB do you harvest in one harvest? 
independently. 
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(m)How much income do you earn from FFB sale in a month? 
(ill Do you harvest in a rotation amongst family members? 
.(Q). Do you share your income from FFB with others outside your own family? 
ill} Do you have a rotation with another cardholder? 
iQ} Do you normally use your FFB records as proof of production for any loan (This is 
separate from NBPOL credit)? IfYES, identify purpose(s) of loan: 
(!:) Have you used your land title as security for any loan (separate from RDB initial 
loans)? 
If YES, identify 
(i) Name the year (s): 
(ii) Name of the bank: 
(v) Purpose of loan : 
(vi) Loan amount each time: 
(v) Interest amount (or rate) each time: 
(s) What is your monthly land rental rate (applicable to LSS) and is it up to date? 
(t) What other crops do you grow (food in garden, vanilla, cocoa, copra)? 
(u) Future plans- expand, sell, buy new block, diversify into other crops (Vanilla, cocoa, 
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copra, food crops), go back home ... etc and provide reason (s) for each response. 
D: Information on Credit (Tables Dl-D5) 
I. If you require credit (cash/in-kind), when do you need it most (specify): purchase 
land, develop land, build house, improve homestead (install tank, electricity, hot 
water system, furniture, white goods), employ labour, buy items necessary for 
production, diversify into a new business (PMV, Poultry, Trade Store, Vanilla, 
Cocoa, Copra), and others?: 
2. Did you obtain items necessary for production from NBPOL last year (2002)? If 
Yes, complete Table DI in answer record sheet 
3. Why did you not buy these production items directly 
(a) from personal savings? 
(b) borrow money from 
(i) banks 
(ii) semi-formal financial institutions 
(iii) informal sources 
instead of taking credit from NBPOL ? 
4: Did you receive the PNGRDB's initial loan (3 loans) arrangement? YES/NO 
(a) IfNO, provide reason: 
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(b) IfYES, complete section (b) in Table D2 of answer sheet 
5: Excluding those items accessible through the NBPOL in-kind credit scheme and 
the initial (3) RDB loan, have you obtained any other credit (cash/in-kind) for any 
of the other purposes mentioned in (1) above, last year (2002)? 
YESD NOD 
If N 0, skip to Section E. 
6: If YES, for each source of credit that you borrowed from, answer the following 
Questions below (Table D3): 
a) Name the financial institution you borrowed from (RDB, PNGBC/BSP, 
Westpac, Savings and Loan Society, relatives & friends, moneylenders, 
traders, others). 
For each source of credit, answer the following questions: 
b) If you borrowed 'in-kind'; state the type of commodity or service you 
borrowed; and ford) and e) state the market value in Kina. 
c) What was the purpose of the loan, as stated to the lender? 
d) What is the loan amount you initially requested? 
e) What is the amount of loan that you fmally received? 
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f) When did you initially inquire about getting the loan? 
g) When did you finally receive the loan? 
h) Have you ever taken any loans from this lender before? How many times? 
i) What is the PMV fare to the lender's office (or home in the case of informal 
lenders) from your home? 
j) Did you need any collateral in applying for the loan? 
YESO NO D 
If NO, skip to 1) 
k) If YES, what type of collateral was required by the lender: 
House, Land title certificate, FFB fruit, Guarantors (by company, OPIC, 
friends & relatives), IBD accounts, trade store, and others. 
1) Did you get the loan directly from the lender or through a group or other 
institutional arrangement (through women 's unions, farmers ' associations, 
OPJC ... etc.)? 
m) What use did you make of the loan? 
n) What were the terms of repayment (repayment interval and amount per 
interval)? 
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o) How much of the credit have you already paid back (all, more than half, 
some but less than half, or none)? 
p) Do you have any close relatives working in any bank? If YES, identify 
bank: 
7. For each of the credit that you took, answer the following questions (Table D 4): 
a) If you had to pay back the loan in-kind, state the commodity or service that will be 
paid back or due. 
b) What was the market value of the commodity or service you paid back? 
c) If you paid back in cash, how much was the interest payment? (if the loan has not 
matured yet, state the total interest payment due). 
d) How much did you spend initially as an application fee? 
e) Beside any application fee, how much did you spend in order to fill out the forms 
and be eligible for the loan? (Include payments to an agent, if any, travel costs and 
!or other costs in connection with the loan, any other entertainment and bribes to 
expedite the loan. You do not have to categorise the payments, just state the total 
expenditure (Use aide memoire). 
f) How many days did you spend away from your normal work in connection with 
the loan? (This will include only work-days missed in connection with the loan. 
Do not include those days that you would not have been gainfully employed and 
you did not spend in connection with the loan). (Time for travelling to and from 
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the lender's place. Time at lender's premises. Time to finish all procedures in 
connection with the loan). 
g) How many trips did you make to the lender in connection with the loan? 
h) For each workday missed in connection with the loan, did you employ someone to 
replace you and at what rate? If you did not employ anyone, what would be the 
best estimate of your daily income forgone? 
i) What is the maturity of the loan? 
7. For those transactions which were not with formal lenders (Table D 5):41 
a) Why did you not obtain the loan from formal lenders? Applied for formal loan 
but rejected Did not apply for formal loan because of perception of a strong 
probability of being rejected Did not apply for formal loan because did not 
want/know. 
b) What is the most important factor that led you to borrow from the stated semi-
formal source (s)? Briefly explain. 
c) What is the most important factor that led you to borrow from the stated 
informal source ( s )? Briefly explain. 
41 Fonnal lenders are commercial banks and PNGRDB; Semi-formal lenders are savings and loan societies, 
micro-finance and micro-credit ; and informal lenders are moneylenders, friends and relatives and Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations. NBPOL in-kind credit is semi-fonnal credit. Note that in the text, these 
different financial institutions were re-classified into three classifications: formal, informal and state 
interventionist financial institutions. 
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d) If informal source was friends and relatives, do yon expect to give cash/in-
kind credit/service/contributions after repaying the loan into the future? 
Yes/No and provide reason. 
E. For those who did not borrow last year (2002) (Table El).Excludes NBPOL. 
1. Why did you not obtain credit from formal sector lenders? 
(Did not apply because no need for credit, applied but rejected, did not apply 
because perceiving a strong likelihood of being rejected, and Other reasons). 
2. Why did you not obtain credit from a semi-formal lender? 
3. Why did you not obtain loan from an informal source? 
F: For all households: Assets held by the household 
State the major assets that belong to the household in Table Fl in response record 
sheet. 
G: Linkage/Relationship with Financial Institutions (Table G 1) 
1. Do you have a bank account? 
YESD NOD 
(a) If NO, provide reasons (No need, applied but rejected, perceived rejection, high 
minimum deposit, do not know about banks). 
(b) If YES, state 
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(i) how many bank accounts, 
(ii) name the bank(s) 
(iii) types of account ( s) 
(iv) year when respective accounts were first opened: 
2. Are you a member of any of the following financial institutions? 
Savings and Loan Society, ROSCA, women's credit group, ... etc. 
YES/NO 
( c) If YES, name of institution: 
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A2 Record of Response 42 
Date ofinterview: 
-----
For Block-holders: 
1. Area name: 2: Division Name: 
4: BlockNo: 
Profile of the Block Title Holder and the Household: 
Table Bl. Household Head and Household 
Age (1) 
Sex (2) 
Main Occupation - in addition to farm (3) 
Education Level ( 4) 
No. members (5) 
Name (A,B,C,D) & Card No.(6) 
No. dependents (7) 
No. Work on Oil Palm block (8) 
No. of hours a week on blockwork per 
oerson (9) 
No. off- Oil Palm Block (10) 
Businesses Activities (11) 
Off Oil Palm monthly family income (12) 
No. children from block in school (13) 
Parents language group/province of origin 
(14) 
Position in community (15) 
Contribution to landowner activities (16) 
42 Blackened represent that this data was obtained from OPIC and SAD. 
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C: Block Description 
Table Cl. Block Description 
No.of Blocks (1) LSS VOP CP 
Registered Titles (2) 
YES,.check rent book(i} 
NO, Reason (ii) 
Features ofBlock(3) . 
Totalfarin area{a) 
Oil .rialm area (b) 
Year firstestablished ( c) 
year of exnansion& hectares ( d) 
Year replanted & hectare ( e) 
No. Fertiliser bags annlied m 
Weedicide time/ No of times weed (g) 
No of hired Jabour & wage rate (h) 
Production items (i) Tick & State enough or not enough for your block 
Wheelbarrow (i) 
Badang (mini tractor) (ii) 
Harvesting Kit (tools+ Net) (iii) 
Spraying~Kit (iv) 
-
No.times OPIC advise(j) 
Attendance in 2002(k) 
FFB tonne iIJ. qne harvest{! ) 
Income in one month (m) 
In block Harvest Rotation (n) 
Share income with others ( o) 
Harvest Rotation with others (p) 
FFB as loan security & loan purpose? ( q) 
Land title as security for loan (r) 
Name the year (s) (i) 
Name of Bank each time (ii) 
Purpose of loan each time (iii) 
Loan amount each time (iv) 
Interest amount each time (v) 
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Monthlv land rental rate & Uo to date (s) I I 
Other Croos (t) I I 
Future plans (u) 
D: Information on Credit 
l. Reasons for credit needed most: 
Table D 1: In-kind Credit from NBPOL in 2002 
Item Quantity Unit Price 
Fertiliser 
Seedlings 
Badang ( smalltractor) 
Wheelbarrow 
Harvestfug pole ~sm 
Harvestfug oole -1 Om 
Harvesting pole ~12m 
Harv¢sting. pole -'14 m 
Harvest)ng Sickle 
Harvesting Chisel 
Net 
File 
Oil Stone 
Knaosack ·Soraver 
Weedicide 
Overalls 
Hand gloves 
Gum boots 
Facial mask 
Goggles 
Total Loan: Amount repaid: Amount Due: 
Reason (s) for not borrowing & buying instead of obtaining from NBPOL: 
From personal savings: 
Borrow from (i) Bank: 
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(ii) Semi-formal financial institution: 
(iii) Informal financial institutions: 
Table D2: RDB Loan Amount 
Loan Type Year Loan Amount Amount repaid Amount 
Outstanding 
No, Reasons (a) 
Yes (b) 
Loan 1 
Loan2 
Loan3 
Table D3. Information on Credit 
Source (a) 
Type of commodity or 
service (b) 
Purpose of loan stated 
(c) 
Initially requested 
amount( d) 
Total amount finally 
received ( e) 
When first requested 
loan (fl 
When finally received 
loan ( g) 
No.of previous loans 
(h) 
PMV ( i) 
Collateral required (i) 
Type of collateral 
/security (k) 
How to get credit (!) 
Actual use of credit (m) 
Terms ofrepayment (n) 
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I Amount repaid k) 
Name of Bank ( ) 
Table D4: Costs of Borrowing 
Source 
Type of commodity or service (a) 
Market value of commodity or service (b) 
Total interest rate or amount ( c) 
Annlication fee ( d) 
Travel and misc.entertainment expenses (e) 
No.of work-davs missed (t) 
No.of trips (g) 
Onoortunity cost of each-work (h) 
Maturitv of the loan (i) 
Table D5: Credit Not from Formal Lenders 
Why Not from Formal Lenders (a) 
Reason for Semi-formal source (b) 
Reason for informal source ( c) 
Transactions after repayment ( d) 
For those who did not borrow last year (2002). 
Table E. l: Reasons for Not Borrowing (Excludes NBPOL credit). 
Financial Institutions Reasons 
Formal (1) 
Semi-formal (2) 
Informal (3) 
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F: For all households: Assets held by the household 
Table Fl. Assets Held by the Household 
Asset Estimated market value 
Land (with title) 
Land (without title) 
House 
Vehicle 
Pahn Trees (Age of trees: 22-years 
economic life ) 
Spraying Kit 
Badang (Small tractor) 
Wheel Barrow 
Harvesting tools 
Tractor 
Fridge/freezer 
Television Set 
Video recorder 
Radio-Cassette 
Furniture 
Trade store 
Poultry 
Cocoa 
Copra 
Vanilla 
Off farm family income (monthly income): 
Savings (estimates): 
Monthlv land rental IMF-VOPs): 
Monthly Royalty payments IME-VOPs): 
NO of Shares (NBPOL and Others) 
Others 
Total Estimated market value: 
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G: Linkage/Relationship with Financial Institutions 
Table G 1: Linkage/Relationship with Financial Institutions 
Has Bank account, YES/NO 
(I) 
NO Bank account, reason (a) 
YES, to Bank Account(b) 
How many bank accounts (i) 
Name the bank(s) (ii) 
Types of Bank account (s) 
(iii) 
Year when respective 
accounts were opened (iv): 
Financial institution member, 
YES/NO (2) 
YES, name institution ( c) 
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Appendix B List of in-depth interviews and group 
discussions 
The following table provides a list of interviews and group discussions referred to in the 
text. The names of the persons are not disclosed for personal confidentiality. 
Location Organisation 
West New Oil Palm Industry 
Britain Corporation Hoskins 
Oil Palm Industry 
Corporation for 
Milnebay, Bialla, 
Popondetta, and New 
Ireland 
Papua New Guinea 
Rural Development 
Bank-Kimbe 
West New Britain 
Provincial Women's 
Council 
New Britain Palm Oil 
Ltd 
Date Person ( s) 
21 July-9 Constant contact and discussions with 
September, all OPIC staff. This includes project 
2003 Manager, Field Manager, Divisional 
Mangers, Lands section, extension 
officers, and staff at the main base 
located at Nahavio. 
27 August, 2003 Project Managers in Kimbe when they 
all attended a training program. 
22 July, 2003 Branch Manager 
29 August, 2003 Executives 
24 July & 6 Company Secretary, Manager 
August, 7 August Smallholder Affairs Division & Mini-
& 7 September, Estate Coordinator 
2003 
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Cocoa & Copra 
Growers Savings and 
Loan Society - Kimbe 
West New Britain 
Savings & Loan 
Society 
Hoskins Small Holder 
Oil Palm Growers 
Association 
Village and 
Community 
West New Britain 
Provincial Lands 
Office 
Bank South Pacific Ltd 
- Loans Manager 
Westpac (PNG Ltd)-
Loans Manager 
Landowners 
31 July, 2003 Loans Officers 
13 August, 2003 Manageress 
31 July, 2003 Executives 
21 July-9 Farmers and others with community 
September,2003 responsibilities 
02 September, Lands adviser and Valuer 
2003 
22 July, 2003 Loans Officer 
22 July, 2003 Sales Manager 
21 July-9 Mini-estate and Customary purchase 
September ,2003 areas 
Landowner Companies 31 July & 6 Managing Director & community 
- Kavugara August, 2003 Liaison officer 
Development 
Corporation & Karato 
Ltd 
Provincial Department 13 August, 2003 Provincial Adviser 
of Agriculture and 
Livestock 
Papua New Guinea Oil 13 August, 2003 Director 
Pahn Research 
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Association 
Port Oil Palm Industry 17 July, 2003 & Corporate Affairs Manager & Special 
Moresby, Corporation- Port 26 September projects coordinator 
National Moresby 
Capital 
District 
Papua New Guinea 19 &24 Smallholder Agricultural Credit 
Rural Development September, 2003 Scheme Manager & Manager Policy 
Bank-Head Office and Planning 
Office of the National 24 September, National Custodian 
Custodian of Trust 2003 
Land 
Registrar of Titles 15 September, Registrar 
2003 
Department of Lands 15 &23 New Guinea Islands Division & 
and Physical Planning September, 2003 Director of Policy 
Bank of Papua New 22, 24 &25 Federation of Savings and Loan 
Guinea September, 2003 Societies, Savings and Loan Society 
Unit & Monetary Policy Unit 
Banks South Pacific 01 October, 2003 Managing Director 
Ltd 
Australia New Zealand 25 September, Managing Director 
Bank (PNG) Ltd 2003 
Westpac (PNG) Ltd 25 September, Loans Administration - Head Office 
2003 staff 
Attorney Generals 1 7 September, Former National Land Titles 
2003 Commissioner 
Department of 17 September, Smallholder Agricultural Credit 
Agriculture and 2003 Scheme Coordinator & Director of 
Livestock Smallholder Support Services 
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University of Papua 24 September, Staff and students born and educated 
New Guinea (UPNG) 2003 in the Hoskins project oil palm blocks 
Kokopa, East East New Britain 10 September, Manageress 
New Britain Savings & Loans 2003 
Society 
Provincial Lands 10 September, Senior Lands officer 
Office 2003 
Cocoa & Copra 10 September, Provisional Administrator 
Growers Savings and 2003 
Loan Society 
Cocoa Marketing 10 September, Senior Economist 
Board 2003 
Islands Regional Lands 10 September, Regional Valuer 
Office 2003 
Goroka, Coffee Industry 30 September, Senior Economist, Smallholder 
Eastern Corporation 2003 Coordinator and Micro-credit Scheme 
Highlands Coordinator 
Province 
Liklik Dinan Arbitore 30 September, Manager 
Trust 2003 
I 
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Appendix C Sample of clan land usage agreement form 
FormA2L 
CLAN LAND USAGE AGREEMENT 
Date .......... 19 ...... . 
To the Rural Development Bank 
We, the undersigned, being the representatives of the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clan, hereby 
acknowledge that ......................... has the right under native law and custom for the 
whole of his life to use the land known as .................. (or more particularly described 
in the plan on the reverse hereof) for the purpose of ................................. with the 
right to receive the proceeds of crops, trees and palms grown, livestock grazed and/or 
business conducted on the said land. We certify that all members of the said clan agree to 
the truth of this certificate and that we are the persons authorised by the clan to sign it. 
Signature of Witness Full name of clan Leader His Signature /Mark 
Signature of Witness Full name of clan Leader His Signature/Mark 
When term of loan exceeds 5 years the section below must be completed in addition to 
the above. 
As Clerk of the .................... Local Government Council, I am of the opinion that the 
above Clan is not prevented under native law and custom from giving the above 
certificate and that the signatures/marks are made by person authorized to commit the 
clan. 
Signature of Witness His Signature/Mark Affix stamp of Council here 
or 
As Clerk of the ......................... Local Government Council, I certify that a formal 
record of claimed rights in accordance with the above certificate has been recorded by the 
Council under the provisions of its Land Use Record Rule. 
Signature of Witness His Signature/Mark Affix stamp of Council here 
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